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Introduction
Since China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at
the end of 2001,1 it has made substantial, even heroic, efforts to change its
laws and regulations. WTO accession has brought not only amendments
to formal written laws, but greater transparency in government administra-
tion, enhanced opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs, and more equal
treatment between foreign and domestic business organizations. One cru-
cial step forward is the Duiwai Maoyi Fa 2004 [Foreign Trade Act 2004]
("FTA 2004"),2 which amended the Duiwai Maoyi Fa 1994 [Foreign Trade
Act 1994] ("FTA 1994"). 3 With just over one year's experience operating
under this new foreign trade regime, a detailed consideration of its
strengths and weaknesses is needed.
The issues to be considered in this article include the nature of the
changes made by the 2004 amendments, the sufficiency of these changes,
what the changes mean for the future of China's foreign trade regime, and
the challenges China will face in the new century. Following an overview
of the history of China's foreign trade regime, the article examines the posi-
tive changes made in the 2004 amendments to the FTA 1994. The article
will then analyze several areas which have not been addressed sufficiently
in the FTA 2004 amendments. To further analyze the post-WTO-accession
foreign trade regulation of China, the author examines the most recent and
sensitive 2005 Interim Textile Exportation Regulation as an illustration of
China's efforts to regulate specific industries. Finally, based on the previ-
ous analysis of China's trade laws in general (FTA) and in specific (Interim
Textile Exportation Regulation), the Article will assess the larger legal chal-
lenges facing China as it moves toward a market economy, which will likely
impact China's trade policy in the future.
1. The WTO's Ministerial Conference approved the text of the agreement for
China's entry into the WTO on November 10, 2001. Press Release, World Trade Organi-
zation, WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China's Accession (Nov. 10, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres01e/pr252_:e.htm. China became a
member of the WTO on December 11, 2001. See NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE AND
ENTRY INTO FORCE ON THE PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, COMPILATION OF THE LEGAL INSTRUMENTS ON CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION (2002).
2. Duiwai maoyi fa 2004 [Foreign Trade Act 2004] (adopted at the Eighth Sess. of
the Tenth Nat'l People's Cong. Standing Comm., Apr. 6, 2004, effective July 1, 2004),
translation available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/policyrelease/ domes-
ticpolicy/200406/20040600229060.html [hereinafter FTA 2004]. The English term for
this statute is usually the Foreign Trade Law. However, in this Article I refer to it as the
Foreign Trade Act so as to distinguish it from the overall area of foreign trade law.
3. Duiwai maoyi fa 1994 [Foreign Trade Act 1994] (adopted at the Seventh Sess. of
the Eighth Nat'l People's Cong. Standing Comm., May 12, 1994, effective July 1, 1994),
translation available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/topic/lawsdata/ chinese-
law/200211/20021100053224.html [hereinafter FTA 1994].
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I. China's Foreign Trade Regime: A Brief Overview
A. History of China's Trade Laws and Administration
Since 1952, China has separated its domestic and foreign trade sectors
by creating two separate regulatory systems, one for domestic trade and
another for foreign trade. Prior to that, an attempt was made to unify the
two sectors by establishing the Central Ministry of Trade on November 2,
1949. 4 This short-lived experiment was abandoned on September 3, 1952,
when it was replaced by the Ministry of Business (Shang Ye Bu) and the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, reinstating two different systems for domestic
and foreign trade.5 In March 1982, the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Affairs and Trade was established. Its primary responsibility was the
administration of foreign trade and foreign economic cooperation. 6 In
1993, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Affairs and Trade was renamed the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. 7 Then, in March
2003, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), which now governs both
domestic trade and foreign trade, was established to integrate the adminis-
tration of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, as well
as certain functions of the former National Planning Commission, and
those of the National Economic and Trade Commission.8 The birth of
MOFCOM marked the beginning of a new epoch-the half-century separa-
tion between domestic and foreign trade was finally abolished.
Though deeply rooted in the planned economy, the separation
between domestic and foreign trade was inefficient and expensive. For
example, on average, the operating costs of foreign trade corporations in
China reached ten percent of the corporation's total worth, much higher
4. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhongyang renmin zhengfu zuzhi fa [Organic Law
of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China] (effective, Sept.
27, 1949), art. 18; Zhengwuyuan zhengmi zi yihao ling [Decree No. 1 of the Government
Administration Council]; see Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China,
Shangwu Bu Jigou Yange [The History of Ministry of Commerce], http://
www.mofcom.gov.cn/mofcom/yange.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2006) [hereinafter The
History of Ministry of Commerce].
5. Guanyu tiaozheng zhongyang renmin zhengfu jigou de jueding [Decision on the
Adjustment of Agencies of the Central People's Government] (promulgated by the Seven-
teenth Meeting of the Central People's Gov't Comm., Aug. 7,1952), art. 2; see The History
of Ministry of Commerce, supra note 4; see also Chinese National People's Congress
Government Chronicle, http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/273561.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 25, 2006).
6. In March 1982, the resolution, adopted at the 22nd Session of the Fifth National
People's Congress Standing Committee, established the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Affairs and Trade. See The History of Ministry of Commerce, supra note 4.
7. In accordance with the resolution adopted on March 16, 1993 at the First Ple-
nary Session of the Eighth National People's Congress, the Ministry of Foreign Economic
Affairs and Trade was renamed the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Coopera-
tion. See id.
8. The MOFCOM is established in accordance with the Guowuyuan jigou gaige
fangan [Structural Reform Plan of State Council], approved by the First Plenary Session
of the Tenth National People's Congress and Guowuyuan guanyu jigou shezhi de tongzhi
[Notice on the Structural Establishment of the State Council]. The MOFCOM is respon-
sible for the regulation of domestic and foreign trade, as well as international economic
cooperation. See id.
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than the brokers' rate of commission of two to three percent.9 Further-
more, the former trade regulation regime was opposed to the trend toward
international trade regulation. 10 Globalization and fierce trade competi-
tion created the need for a uniform administration system.
B. Structure of China's Foreign Trade Laws
Prior to the FTA 1994, China had no special law enacted by National
People's Congress which comprehensively deals with international trade. " I
When the FTA 1994 was adopted, it was clearly the most important foreign
trade regulation of its time. However, after ten years in operation, it
seemed incapable of adequately handling foreign trade issues.12 The 2004
amendments to the FTA 1994 dramatically changed China's trade laws,
and more importantly, fulfilled China's WTO obligations. Besides the
2004 amendments, China has developed a network of foreign trade laws
and administrative regulations,' 3 many of which regulate international
trade in more detail. Such regulations include Huowu jinchukou guanli
tiaoli [Regulation on the Administration of the Import and Export of
Goods, RAIEG], 14 Duiwai maoyi jingyingzhe beian dengji banfa [Measures
for Registration for the Record of Foreign Trade Operators, MRRFTO],' 5
Jinchukou guanshui tiaoli [Regulations on Import and Export Duties], 16
9. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO DUIWAI MAOYI FA: TIAOWEN JINGSHI JI GUOJI GUIZE
[UNDERSTANDING FOREIGN TRADE LAW OF PRC AND RELATED INTERNATIONAL RULES] 10
(Huang Dongli & Wang Zhenmin eds., 2004).
10. See Edward John Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and
the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 285, 293-94 (1987) (describing
the shift away from protectionism in the United States trade policy).
11. The National People's Congress is "the highest organ of state power" and in
effect, the legislature of the People's Republic of China. See XIAN FA arts. 57, 58 (1982)
(P.R.C.), translation available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/consti-
tution.html (Mar. 22, 2004).
12. Che Yuming et. al., Xiugai waimaofa youliyu zhongguo waimao jiankang fazhand
[MOFCOM: Amendment of Foreign Trade Law to Promote the Healthy Development of
China's Foreign Trade], XINHUA NEWs, Apr. 6, 2004, available at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/newscenter/2004-04/06/content_1404484.htm.
13. See Li Gaozhao, Yiju rushi chengnuo wanshan fazhi, zhongguo shangwu falv cheng
san da liangdian [Perfection of Laws According to WTO Accession Commitment, Three Points
Highlighted in China's Trade Laws], INT'L Bus. DAILY, available at http://
www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2005/2005-01-10/26/526574.shtml (last visited Feb. 3,
2006)
14. Huowu jinchukou guanli tiaoli [Regulation on the Administration of the Import
and Export of Goods] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 10, 2001), available at
http://en.ec.com.cn/pubnews/2003_0216/200604/1000888.jsp [hereinafter RAIEG].
15. Duiwai maoyi jingyingzhe beian dengji banfa [Measures for Registration for the
Record of Foreign Trade Operators] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, June
19, 2004), available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/a/200406/200406002392
62.html [hereinafter MRRFTO]. For a brief introduction to the MRRFTO, see China:
Registration of Foreign Trade Operators, http://www.hg.org/articles/article_451.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
16. Jinchukou guanshui tiaoli [Regulations on Import and Export Duties] (promul-
gated by the State Council, Nov. 23, 2003), translation available at http://
english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/topic/lawsdata/chineselaw/20041 1/
20041100311020.html.
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Fanbutie tiaoli [Countervailing Regulation], 17 Fanqingxiao tiaoli [Anti-
dumping Regulation], 18 Baozhang cuoshi tiaoli [Regulation on Safeguard
Measures], 19 and Jinchukou huowu yuanchandi tiaoli [Regulations on
Rules of Origin of Import and Export Commodities], 20 among others.
Related rules include Haiguan fa [Customs Law], 2 1 Hetong fa [Contract
Law], 2 2 Zhongwai hezuo jingying qiye fa [Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative
Joint Ventures], 2 3 Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye fa [Law on Sino-foreign
Equity Joint Ventures], 24 and Waizi qiye fa [Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprises]. 25
II. New Amendments to China's Foreign Trade Act
The 2004 amendments made a number of significant changes to the
FTA 1994. First, the National People's Congress adjusted those FTA 1994
provisions which were inconsistent with China's commitments to the
WTO.26 Second, the FTA 2004 provided for implementation mechanisms
17. Fanbutie tiaoli [Countervailing Regulation], (promulgated by the State Council,
Nov. 26, 2001) (amended 2004), translation available at http://en.ec.com.cn/pubnews/
2003_02_16/200678/1000045.jsp.
18. Fanqingxiao tiaoli [Anti-dumping Regulation] (promulgated by the State Coun-
cil, Nov. 26, 2001) (amended 2004), translation available at http://en.ec.com.cn/
pubnews/2003.02_16/200678/1000059.jsp.
19. Baozhang cuoshi tiaoli [Regulation on Safeguard Measures] (promulgated by the
State Council, Nov. 26, 2001) (amended 2004), translation available at http://
www.sccietac.org/cietac/en/content/content.jsp?id=921.
20. Jinchukou huowu yuanchandi tiaoli [Regulations on Rules of Origin of Import
and Export Commodities] (promulgated by the State Council, Sept. 3, 2004), translation
available at http://www.tdctrade.com/report/reg/reg_050103.htm.
21. Haiguan fa [Customs Law], available at http://www.bjcustoms.gov.cn/flgd/
lawdata/hgfg/customslaw.htm (last visited July 29, 2005).
22. Hetong fa [Contract Law], translation available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/topic/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100064766.html (last visited July
29, 2005).
23. Zhongwai hezuo jingying qiye fa [Law on Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Ven-
tures], translation available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/topic/lawsdata/
chineselaw/200301/20030100065891.html (last visited July 29, 2005).
24. Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye fa [Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures],
translation available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/topic/lawsdata/ chinese-
law/200301/20030100062855.html (last visited July 29, 2005).
25. Waizi qiye fa [Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises], translation available
at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/topic/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/200301
00062858.html (last visited July 29, 2005).
26. An example of such an inconsistency is the requirement in article 9 of the FTA
1994 that a foreign trade dealer shall "acquire the permit from the authority responsible
for foreign trade and economic relations under the State Council." FTA 1994, supra note
3, art. 9. This provision is not entirely consistent with both § 5(1) of China's Protocol on
the Accession of the People's Republic of China and the Working Party Report on
China's WTO Accession. See World Trade Organization, China's Protocol on the Acces-
sion of the People's Republic of China § 5(1), WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acc-e/completeacc-e.htm#chn [hereinafter
China Protocol]; Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the Working Party
on the Accession of China 84, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1, 2001), available at http://
unpanl .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/ UNPANO02144.pdf [here-
inafter Working Party Report]. Section 5(1) of the China Protocol provides that "China
shall progressively liberalize the availability and scope of the right to trade, so that,
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and procedures to exercise China's rights as a WTO member in accordance
with China's commitments and the WTO Agreements. 2 7 Third, the legisla-
ture passed amendments responding to numerous issues, including intel-
lectual property, administrative efficiency, and external trade barriers. 28
These issues were not sufficiently addressed under the FTA 1994.29 As
MOFCOM stated, the 2004 amendments have taken into consideration
"the general situation since 1994 and the needs in the promotion of...
international trade."30
The 2004 amendment converted the FTA from protection-oriented leg-
islation to action-oriented legislation. The latter approach has been
adopted by major trading countries such as the United States and Japan. 31
Certain unfair trade barriers and protectionism that China has encoun-
tered contribute to this change as well, and this proactive approach may be
helpful in establishing a more fair international trade environment for
China.
A. Accomplishments of the Recent FTA Amendments
1. Procedural Reform
Under the FTA 1994, foreign trade operations were required to either
within three years after accession, all enterprises in China shall have the right to trade in
all goods throughout the customs territory of China." China Protocol, supra, § 5(1).
Paragraph 84(a) of the Working Party Report specifies that "China would eliminate its
system of examination and approval of trading rights within three years after accession.
At that time, China would permit all enterprises in China and foreign enterprises and
individuals, including sole proprietorships of other WTO Members, to export and
import all goods." Working Party Report, supra, '1 84(a).
27. All texts of the WTO Agreements are available at http://www.wto.org.
28. See FTA 2004, supra note 2, arts. 29-31 (providing for the protection of trade-
related aspects of intellectual property rights), 37(2) (enabling the foreign trade authori-
ties to conduct investigations related to "trade barriers of relevant countries or regions").
Certain procedural reforms under the FTA 2004 could also enhance administrative effi-
ciency. For example, the new registration requirement under article 9 of the FTA 2004,
replacing the special permit requirement on foreign trade operations under article 9 of
the FTA 1994, might contribute to more efficiency within the foreign trade
administration.
29. See FTA 1994, supra note 3; FTA 2004, supra note 2, arts. 29-31 (providing for
the protection of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights), 37(2) (enabling
the foreign trade authorities to conduct investigations related to "trade barriers of rele-
vant countries or regions").
30. MOFCOM, Waimao fa xiugai de zhuyao neirong jiqi yiyi [The Major Content and
Significance of Amendment to the FTA 1994], Apr. 7, 2004, http://www.mofcom.
gov.cn/aarticle/a/200404/20040400205975.htm [hereinafter Major Content and
Significance].
31. The United States is "pursuing a proactive trade strategy." Geza Feketekuty, An
American Trade Strategy for the 21st Century, in TRADE STRATEGIES FOR A NEW ERA: ENSUR-
ING U.S. LEADERSHIP IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (Geza Feketekuty ed., 1997), available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/feg01/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2006).
Japan should "pursue proactive trade policies that are consistent with [Japan's] cur-
rent domestic economic agenda for structural reform." MITI Minister's Remarks on the
"New Economy Initiative," 1, available at http://www.meti.go.jp/english/topic/data/
eUS001208e.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
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obtain special permits32 or to engage a foreign trade dealer as its agent to
conduct foreign trade on its behalf.3 3 A Chinese importer must therefore
have held a permit to conduct business with imported and exported prod-
ucts or must have entrusted a Chinese foreign trade operator 34 with the
handling of the business. The FTA 2004 has abolished this special permit
requirement and replaced it with registration procedures, 3 5 a great break-
through in the trade administration system, which facilitates the develop-
ment of international trade. To understand how this procedure works,
suppose that a foreign company has obtained an export license in its home
country and would like to sell its products to a Chinese company. Suppose
further that these products are neither prohibited nor restricted by China's
foreign trade laws.36 Under the FTA 1994, the Chinese company would
either need a permit to conduct business with the importer or must entrust
a Chinese foreign trade operator with the handling of the business.
Because the latter method is usually the faster way to transact the business,
the foreign trade operator would conclude a commission agreement with
the Chinese company. Under the 2004 amendments, in contrast, the Chi-
nese company must register with the authority responsible for foreign trade
or its authorized bodies unless specific laws, regulations, or the authority
do not so require;37 the same is true if the Chinese company hopes to
engage in the import and export of technology. 38 The old procedure
meant higher costs and lower efficiency for Chinese foreign trade busi-
nesses, especially for small dealers, which hampered their development.
Undoubtedly the new registration requirement is more transparent and
helps promote international trade with the world's large trading powers. 3 9
32. Article 9 of the FTA 1994 requires that a foreign trade dealer shall "acquire the
permit from the authority responsible for foreign trade and economic relations under
the State Council." FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 9.
33. Id. art. 13 ("Any organization or individual without foreign trade operation per-
mit may entrust a foreign trade dealer located in China as its agent to conduct its foreign
trade business within the business scope of the latter.").
34. It is, to certain degree, similar to an import broker.
35. FTA 2004, article 9 states:
Foreign trade dealers engaged in import and export of goods or technologies
shall register with the authority responsible for foreign trade under the State
Council or its authorized bodies unless laws, regulations, and the authority
responsible for foreign trade under the State Council do not so require.
FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 9.
36. For the rules regarding restriction or prohibition on the importation or exporta-
tion of goods, see id. arts. 11 (state trade control), 14 (free trade), 15 (automatic licens-
ing), 16 (restrictions or prohibitions), 18 (means of limitation); see also relevant
administrative regulations such as the RAIEG, supra note 14, art. 22 (automatic licens-
ing). All these rules might be invoked to determine whether a company's goods are
restricted or prohibited under China's foreign trade laws.
37. According to the MRRFTO, foreign trade operators are required to go through
registration and record-making formalities at MOFCOM or with its agents. See
MRRFTO, supra note 15, art. 2.
38. Article 9 of the FTA 2004, supra note 2, applies to foreign trade dealers engaged
in import and export of goods or technologies.
39. In 2003, China ranked as the fourth largest exporter and third largest importer
in world merchandise trade. See WTO, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICs 2004, at 19
(2004) available at http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/statis-e/its2004_e/its2004_e.pdf.
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2. Access for Individuals
In accordance with the FTA 1994, "foreign trade dealers" referred to
"legal entities or other organizations" that engage in foreign trade deal-
ings.40 After the 2004 amendments, the term "foreign trade dealers" now
includes individuals within the group authorized to enter the import and
export business.4 1 Only those individuals who have fulfilled the industrial
and commercial registration requirements or other practicing procedures
and engage in foreign trade dealings in accordance with the law 42 may be
competent to enter into foreign trade.4 3 Previously, these individuals had
no access to international trade transactions. The 2004 amendments
greatly facilitate international trade transactions carried out by individuals
in China.
3. Principle of Quota Distribution
The 2004 amendments also made changes to the principle of quota
distribution. Under the former trade administration regime, quotas were
distributed based on principles of "efficiency, impartiality, transparency
and fair competition" according to the performance and abilities of the
applicants. 44 There are two changes in the 2004 amendments. First, the
performance and capacity of the applicants will no longer be considered in
the distribution of quotas.4 5 Second, the principle of equity has been
incorporated into the distribution of quotas, and the principle of fair com-
petition has been eliminated from the text of the quota allocation provi-
sion. The new law has established new principles of "transparency, equity,
impartiality and efficiency" for the distribution of quotas.46 This develop-
ment is partially due to China's commitment to the China Protocol on the
Accession of the People's Republic of China ("China Protocol"), 4 7 which
primarily requires that the allocation of quotas and other related approvals
not be conditioned on export performance. 48 Thus, the FTA 2004 high-
lights key principles of the WTO-transparency and non-discrimination.
40. FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 8.
41. In the FTA 2004, "foreign trade dealers" refers to "legal persons, other organiza-
tions or individuals that have fulfilled the industrial and commercial registration or
other practicing procedures in accordance with laws and engage in foreign trade deal-
ings in compliance with this Law and other relevant laws and administrative regula-
tions." FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 8.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 20(1).
45. Article 20(1) of the FTA 1994 specifies that "import and export quotas of goods
shall be distributed on the basis of the conditions including but not limited to the actual
import or export performance and capability of the applicants in foreign trade dealings
.... " Id.
46. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 20.
47. See China Protocol, supra note 26.
48. See id. Part I, 1 7(3). The China Protocol requires that:
[D]istribution of import licences, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, or any other means
of approval for importation, the right of importation or investment by national
and sub-national authorities, is not conditioned on: whether competing domes-
tic suppliers of such products exist; or performance requirements of any kind,
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4. Expanded Coverage
The FTA 2004 adds some new provisions on state trading,49 automatic
licensing,50 the protection of trade-related aspects of intellectual property
rights,5 1 foreign trade investigation, 5 2 and foreign trade remedies, 53
addressing numerous issues previously left open under national law.
5. Free Imports and Exceptions
In the FTA 1994, imports of goods were in principle free, but subject
to a system of restrictions and prohibitions. This principle remained in the
2004 amendments. The difference is that the 2004 amendment try to fur-
ther improve the exceptional provisions to free trade in a clearer way.
Under the 2004 amendments, in principle, the import of goods is free,'5 4
but subject to a system of restrictions and prohibitions.55 The restrictions
and prohibitions are applicable to imports and exports, and also delineate
eleven conditions under which restriction is possible, five of which where
such as local content, offsets, the transfer of technology, export performance or
the conduct of research and development in China.
Id.
49. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 11.
50. Id. art. 15.
51. Id. arts. 29-31.
52. Id. arts. 37-39.
53. Id. arts. 40-50.
54. Id. art. 14.
55. Id. art 16. Article 16 provides:
The State may restrict or prohibit the import or export of relevant goods and
technologies for the following reasons that:
(1) the import or export needs to be restricted or prohibited in order to safe-
guard the state security, public interests or public morals,
(2) the import or export needs to be restricted or prohibited in order to protect
the human health or security, the animals and plants life or health or the
environment,
(3) the import or export needs to be restricted or prohibited in order to imple-
ment the measures relating to the importations and exportations of gold or
silver,
(4) the export needs to be restricted or prohibited in the case of domestic
shortage in supply or the effective protection of exhaustible natural resources,
(5) the export needs to be restricted in the case of the limited market capacity of
the importing country or region,
(6) the export needs to be restricted in the case of the occurrence of serious
confusion in the export operation order,
(7) the import needs to be restricted in order to establish or accelerate the estab-
lishment of a particular domestic industry,
(8) the restriction on the import of agricultural, animal husbandry or fishery
products in any form is necessary,
(9) the import needs to be restricted in order to maintain the State's interna-
tional financial status and the balance of international payment,
(10) the import or export needs to be restricted or prohibited as laws and
administrative regulations so provide, or
(11) the import or export needs to be restricted or prohibited as the interna-
tional treaties or agreements to.which the state is a contracting party or a partic-
ipating party so require.
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import and export can be prohibited.5 6 In addition, some conditions
empower the State to take "any measures" with respect to the import or
export of goods and technologies. 57 The tenth condition provides that
exports or imports can be restricted or prohibited if the "laws and adminis-
trative regulations so provide."158 This requires further clarification. Since
it is fairly difficult for the list of eleven conditions to cover all the concrete
situations individually, the FTA 2004 uses the phrase "as laws and admin-
istrative regulations so provide." However, this primarily means that
China would be able to cope with international trade problems that do not
fall within the other ten categories. This is not without any limitation,
however, as China must comply with its WTO commitments and obliga-
tions. It is important to note that the provisions for trade in services differ.
In six situations, trade in services may be restricted or prohibited. 5 9
Even if a particular import or export trade transaction were not pro-
hibited or restricted under the FTA 2004, it still might be subject to auto-
matic licensing. 60 For some goods under free import it is necessary for
monitoring purposes to apply for an automatic import license.6 1 This is
permissible under the China Protocol. 6
2
Another field that may involve foreign trade with China is state trad-
Id. art. 16.
56. Id.
57. For instance, article 17 of the FTA 2004 stipulates that:
[I]n the case of the import or export of the goods and technologies relating to
fissionable and fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived as well as the import or export relating to arms, ammunition and imple-
ments for war, [the State may] take any measures as necessary to safeguard the
state security. The State may, in the time of war or for the protection of interna-
tional peace and security, take any measures as necessary in respect of import
or export of goods and technologies.
Id. art. 17. Article 27 of the FTA 2004, which has similar provisions, applies to interna-
tional trade in services related to state security. Id. art. 27.
58. Id. art. 16(10).
59. Under article 26 of the FTA 2004, these six situations are:
(1) restrictions or prohibitions are needed to safeguard the state security, public
interests or public morals,
(2) restrictions or prohibitions are needed to protect the human health or secur-
ity, the animals and plants life or health or the environment,
(3) restrictions are needed to establish or accelerate the establishment of a par-
ticular domestic service industry,
(4) restrictions are needed to maintain the balance of international payment of
the state,
(5) restrictions or prohibitions are needed as laws and administrative regula-
tions so provide, or
(6) restrictions or prohibitions are needed as the international treaties or agree-
ments to which the state is a contracting party or a participating party so
require.
Id. art. 26.
60. Id. art. 15.
61. Id. art. 15; see also RAIEG, supra note 14, art. 22.
62. "China shall report annually to the Committee on Import Licensing on its auto-
matic import licensing procedures, explaining the circumstances which give rise to these
requirements and justifying the need for their continuation." See China Protocol, supra
note 26, § 8(1)(c).
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ing. 63 Some goods are subject to state trade control, under which the State
handles foreign trade with certain goods through state-run enterprises. 64
The State could also permit non-state enterprises to engage in the import
and export of such goods, though other enterprises are not allowed to
engage in such transactions. 65
How could China carry out the aforementioned limitation? The
importation of goods is not automatically restricted, prohibited, or subject
to licensing or state trading in case the goods fall into one of the aforemen-
tioned categories. On one hand, restrictions or prohibitions are usually
made by MOFCOM pursuant to article 18 of the FTA 2004, which formu-
lates, readjusts, and publicizes a category of goods whose import is
restricted or prohibited. 66 This is also the case for automatic licensing and
state trading.67 On the other hand, MOFCOM can, independently or in
conjunction with other relevant authorities under the State Council, specif-
ically decide to restrict or prohibit the import of certain goods.68 In the
latter case, in accordance with the requirements of articles 16 and 17 of
FTA 2004, MOFCOM must obtain the approval of the State Council and
decide, on a temporary basis, whether to impose restrictions or prohibi-
tions on the import and export of goods and technologies not included
under article 18 of the FTA 2004.69 This means that the importation of
goods is free as long as MOFCOM has not declared otherwise. If the prod-
ucts are not listed in a catalogue pursuant to article 11(1) of the FTA 2004
and articles 22 and 45 of the RAIEG, or subject to a special decision of
MOFCOM in accordance with article 18(2) of the FTA 2004, the import
transaction should be approved. 70
With regards to trade in services, the determination and adjustment of
the market access list of international trade in services is quite similar to
that of exported and imported goods and technology. 71 The difference is
that the FTA 2004 does not expressly authorize competent authorities to
impose restrictions and prohibitions on trade in services not already listed.
6. Foreign Trade Remedies
Because the FTA 1994 included few stipulations on foreign trade rem-
edies, rules related to such remedies have been incorporated into the FTA
2004. The rules on foreign trade remedies cover a number of new fields,
63. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 11.
64. Id. art. 11; RAIEG, supra note 14, arts. 45-52.
65. RAIEG, supra note 14, arts. 47, 51.
66. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 18.
67. RAIEG, supra note 14, arts. 22, 45.
68. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 18(2).
69. Id. art. 18.
70. This conclusion necessarily flows from the statutory structure.
71. Compare FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 28 ("The authority responsible for foreign
trade under the State Council . . . shall . . . determine, adjust and publish the market
access list of international trade in services.") with FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 18 ("The
authority responsible for foreign trade under the State Council ... shall . . . establish,
adjust and publish the list of goods and technologies of which the import or export is
subject to restrictions or prohibitions.").
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including import-export pre-warning and emergency systems 72 and anti-
circumvention measures. 73 Further, the FTA 2004 expanded upon certain
relevant stipulations in the FTA 1994.74 The major changes in this respect
are as follows.
a) Anti-dumping, Safeguards, and Countervailing Measures
Both the FTA 1994 and the 2004 amendments have nearly identical
provisions on anti-dumping, 75 except for some minor changes in terminol-
ogy. Moreover, the FTA 2004 has incorporated a rule76 which essentially
mirrors the anti-dumping rule related to third parties in the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. 7 7
With regard to safeguards, 78 the FTA 2004 has changed some impor-
tant terminology. First, referring to increases in imports, the wording has
changed from "increased quantities"79 to "substantially increased quanti-
ties."80 Second, the term "domestic producers"81 in FTA 1994 has been
changed to "domestic industry.
8 2
The change from "increased quantities" to "substantially increased
quantities" sets a higher threshold for the initiation of a safeguard measure,
and thus would more significantly limit the availability of safeguard mea-
72. Id. art. 49.
73. Id. art. 50.
74. These provisions involve anti-dumping, countervailing measures, and
safeguards.
75. Compare FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 30, with FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 41.
76. Article 42 of the FTA 2004 stipulates that:
Where the export of a product from other countries or regions to the market of a
third country causes or threatens to cause material injury to the established
domestic industries, or materially retards the establishment of domestic indus-
tries, the authority responsible for foreign trade under the State Council may, on
the request of the domestic industries, carry out consultations with the govern-
ment of that third country and require it to take appropriate measures.
FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 42.
77. World Trade Organization, The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 14, WT/MIN(01)/17.
78. See FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 44; FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 29.
79. According to article 29 of the FTA 1994, one of the preconditions for safeguard
measures is that the product at issue must be imported in "such increased quantities
.... .FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 29 (emphasis added).
80. Under article 44 of the FTA 2004, safeguards can be imposed only when a
"product is being imported in substantially increased quantities .... FTA 2004, supra
note 2, art. 44 (emphasis added).
81. Article 29 of the FTA 1994 stipulates that "[w]here a product is imported in such
increased quantities as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic produc-
ers of like or directly competitive products, the State may take necessary safeguard mea-
sures to remove or ease such injury or threat of injury." FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 29.
82. Article 44 of the FTA 2004. provides that "[w]here a product is being imported in
substantially increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to
cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive
products, the State may take safeguard measures as necessary to eliminate or mitigate
such injury or threat of injury and provide the industry concerned with necessary sup-
port." FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 44.
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sures. The change from "domestic producers" to "domestic industry" is
meant to adopt the terminology used in the Agreement on Safeguards8 3
and to avoid possible ambiguity in the future. Another notable develop-
ment in the stipulation of safeguards is that if the conditions for safeguard
measures are met, the State may not only take safeguard measures, but also
provide the affected industry "necessary support"84 which is not stipulated
in the FTA 1994. The provision of "necessary support" might be, to a cer-
tain degree, similar to the trade adjustment assistance in the United States.
Regarding countervailing measures,8 5 the FTA 2004 substitutes "spe-
cific subsidy" for "subsidy." This change makes the countervailing stipula-
tion of the FTA 2004 consistent with the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures.8 6
Given the changes discussed above, it is apparent that Chinese laws
seek to incorporate rules consistent with those of the WTO. In certain
situations, the Chinese laws even set a standard higher than the WTO obli-
gations require.
b) Emergency Safeguard Measures for Services
For international trade in services, the FTA 2004 has adopted a special
provision for emergency safeguard measures. 8 7 The General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) provides for a stipulation on emergency safe-
guard measures,8 8 which calls for multilateral negotiations on the question
of emergency measures. In practice, such negotiations have rarely
occurred within the WTO. Therefore, China wanted to adopt rules neces-
sary to handle the possible injuries which its relatively less competitive
service industry might suffer after WTO accession. This FTA 2004 stipula-
tion differs from those for safeguards applicable to goods,8 9 because the
former requires "increase of services" that "causes or threatens to cause
injury to the domestic industries"90 while the latter requires "substantially
increased quantities" that "cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry."9 ' Given this terminology, it is easier under the FTA
83. Agreement on Safeguards art. 2(1), Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/25-safeg.pdf ("A Member may apply a safeguard
measure to a product only if . . . such product is being imported into its territory...
under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic
industry .... ) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Safeguards Agreement].
84. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 44.
85. See id. art. 43; FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 31.
86. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures arts. 1.2, 2, Apr. 15,
1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf.
87. Under article 45 of the FTA 2004, if the increase of services provided to China
by outside service suppliers causes or threatens to cause injury to the domestic indus-
tries that provide like or directly competitive services, the State may take necessary rem-
edies to "eliminate or mitigate such injury or threat of injury and provide such industry
with necessary support." FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 45.
88. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 10, opened for signature Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
89. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 44.
90. Id. art. 45 (emphasis added).
91. Id. art. 44 (emphasis added).
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2004 to adopt the emergency safeguard measures for services than those
for products. There are two main reasons for this. First, services are intan-
gible and thus harder to regulate. With the development of technology, it
becomes increasingly difficult to identify and regulate the online provision
of professional services such as counseling and legal services. Given this,
it would be unreasonable and impractical to require that the emergency
safeguard measures for services could only be taken once there is a sub-
stantial increase of services provided to China. Second, China's service
industries are generally less competitive, and therefore are vulnerable to a
sudden increase of services from other countries or regions, thus necessi-
tating special safeguard measures.
d) Diversions of Trade
A new stipulation has been incorporated into the FTA 2004 to handle
diversions of trade. The stipulation enables China to take measures to
restrict the import of certain products.9 2 Three conditions must be met
before such a remedy can be lawfully applied. First, the restriction must be
imposed by a third country on the import of a certain product. Second,
this restriction must cause the increase in imports of the product. Finally,
the increase must cause or threaten to cause injury to the established
domestic industry, or materially retards the establishment of related
domestic industries. 93 It is important to note that China itself is subject to
similar provisions under the China Protocol.9 4
7. Improved Provisions of Legal Liability
The FTA 1994 contained only four articles related to legal liability.9 5
All of the provisions were quite general ones. The punishments for viola-
tions were insufficient in their limited methods, which heavily relied on
criminal penalties, administrative sanctions, and fines. 9 6 Since these pun-
ishments were insufficient to deal with violations of trade laws, the FTA
2004 has nearly doubled the stipulations on legal liability.97 First, the FTA
2004 has increased the varieties of punishments available. Specifically, the
government is now able to reject foreign trade applications from those trad-
ers who have violated trade laws,9 8 to issue rectification orders to law-
breakers,9 9 to confiscate illegal proceeds, 10 0 and to prohibit lawbreakers
from engaging in certain foreign transactions within a stipulated period. 10 1
92. Id. art. 46.
93. Id.
94. China Protocol, supra note 26, § 16.8.
95. FTA 1994, supra note 3, arts. 38-41.
96. Criminal punishments have been incorporated into all four articles relating to
legal liabilities in the FTA 1994.
97. Chapter 10 of the FTA 2004, consisting of seven articles, specifically deals with
legal liabilities. See FTA 2004, supra note 2, arts. 60-66.
98. Id. arts. 60, 61(3).
99. Id. arts. 61(2), 62.
100. Id.
101. Id. arts. 61(3), 62(2), 63. Under article 64 of the FTA 2004:
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Second, the FTA 2004 incorporates the penalties available for the violation
of rules on international trade in services.' 0 2 Finally, the FTA 2004 pro-
vides for access to judicial review of specific administrative acts. 10 3 This
change is obviously closely connected to China's commitment to WTO
Accession.' 0 4 All of these new rules will help China fight against potential
violations of foreign trade laws.
B. Critique of the FTA 2004
There are seven specific criticisms of the FTA 2004 which this Article
will address: (1) the vagueness of the stipulations; (2) the weakness of Chi-
nese trade associations; (3) the issue of tax reimbursements for newly-
established small foreign trade enterprises; (4) the harmonization of rules
for domestic and foreign trade; (5) MOFCOM's increased role in dispute
settlements; (6) rules to handle dislocations resulting from China's WTO
accession; and (7) flawed rules on the issue of agency in foreign trade.
While there are other potential problems with the 2004 amendments, these
seven issues appear to be the most pressing.
1. Vagueness of Stipulations
The vague and very general provisions of the FTA 2004 leave consider-
able room for administrative agencies. The imprecision of FTA 2004 provi-
sions makes it difficult for authorities to effectively handle the challenges
they encounter in the fast paced world of international trade. For example,
the lack of clear guidelines for investigation and response hinders the Chi-
nese administrative agencies' ability to respond effectively to unfair trade
barriers imposed by foreign trade partners, the abuse of intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs), or other such problems. It would be better if the FTA
2004 had more detailed provisions. Moreover, as compared to similar
trade regulations in the United States, European Union, Japan, and
Canada, several of the FTA 2004 provisions are less detailed. For instance,
the FTA 2004 has specifically tried to protect trade-related aspects of IPRs.
However, with only a very short stipulation addressing IPRs,' 0 5 the FTA
[W]ithin the period of prohibition the Customs authority shall not grant release
to the relevant imported or exported goods of that foreign trade dealer in accor-
dance with the decision made by the authority responsible under the State
Council, and the foreign exchange administration or designated foreign
exchange banks shall not process the procedures of selling and purchasing for-
eign exchange.
Id. art. 64.
102. Id. art. 62.
103. Id. art. 66.
104. See China Protocol, supra note 26, § 2(D)(1). China is obliged to:
[E]stablish, or designate, and maintain tribunals, contact points and procedures
for the prompt review of all administrative actions relating to the implementa-
tion of laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general
application referred to in article X:1 of the GATT 1994, article VI of the GATS
and the relevant provisions of the TRIPS Agreement.
Id.
105. Under article 29 of the FTA 2004:
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2004 fails to include detailed and effective remedy provisions available
when Chinese industries encounter imported goods that infringe patents,
trademarks, and copyrights. In contrast, section 337 of the United States
Tariff Act of 1930106 is much more detailed, and "is a remedy that has
been immensely popular as a vehicle for aiding U.S. industries faced with
imported goods that infringe patents, trademarks and copyrights." 10 7 It
might be a wise choice to further improve the FTA 2004 by providing more
trade remedies under such circumstances.
2. Weakness of Trade Associations
It has long been a concern that trade associations, councils of com-
merce, and other such organizations fail to operate effectively inside
China.10 8 Since "government functions should be strictly separated from
enterprise management," 10 9 many powers originally controlled by the gov-
ernment have been conferred to trade associations since China's accession
to the WTO. However, because of the influence of the former planned
economy, many trade associations have failed to enhance self-disciplinary
procedures or provide services to members towards protecting their legiti-
mate rights; they still resemble government agencies 01 0 rather than market-
oriented organizations. Unfortunately, the FTA 2004 fails to provide a
workable solution to this problem. In practice, a major issue complicating
anti-dumping settlement negotiations is maintaining a unified position
among the various Chinese enterprises (who are of course competitors
with each other) inside the Chinese trade associations assisting those
enterprises responding to potential or actual anti-dumping charges."'
Engendering cooperation among competitors presents some very interest-
The State shall, in accordance with laws and administrative regulations relevant
to intellectual property rights, protect trade-related aspects of intellectual prop-
erty rights. Where the imported goods infringe intellectual property rights and
impair foreign trade order, the authority responsible for foreign trade under the
State Council may take such measures as prohibiting the import of the relevant
goods from being produced or sold by the infringe [sic] within a certain period.
FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 29.
106. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000) (dealing with unfair trade practices and methods of
competition in the importation of products into the United States.).
107. Leslie Alan Glick, Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Unfair Trade Practices and
Methods of Competition in the Importation of Products into the United States), in MANuAL
FOR THE PRACTICE OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw 6 (William Kitchell Ince & Leslie
Alan Glick eds., 2001).
108. ZhangJin, Promoting International Dialogue, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 19, 2004, at 11.
109. Meng Yan, Premier Demands Licensing Reforms, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 7, 2004, at 1.
110. In the 1990s "the government restructured some of its departments and minis-
tries into associations." Zhang Jin, Promoting International Dialogue, CHINA DAILY, Aug.
19, 2004, at 11.
111. Similar problems existed in recent collective iron ore negotiation between China
and Australia, where two Chinese enterprises agreed with Austrialia to purchase iron ore
at higher prices at a tough stage of the negotiation. See Suo Hanxue, Tiekuangshi tanpan
jinru jianfeng shike, panbianzhe renu shangwubu [Iron Ore Negotiation at its Crucial
Stage, "Ratters" Roil Ministry of Commerce], ZHONGGUO JINGYING BAO (CHINA BUSINESS),
Feb. 18, 2006, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060218/08372353628.
shtml.
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ing theoretical challenges in the anti-dumping context. More importantly,
the 2004 amendments fail to address how Chinese trade associations could
be more effective in encouraging competitors facing anti-dumping trade
cases to cooperate. Although it is not all that difficult to obtain informa-
tion regarding individual enterprises which are not complying with the self
regulatory arrangements made by Chinese trade associations, there are sig-
nificant problems in enforcing sanctions on such noncomplying enter-
prises. This long-standing problem remains unresolved.
Developing stronger trade associations for Chinese enterprises would
also greatly help protect their legitimate rights under the WTO, especially
in persuading the Chinese government to initiate complaints against other
members that violate WTO rules. In order to challenge practices inconsis-
tent with WTO rules by recourse to the Dispute Settlement Body, a Member
may request conciliation1 12 and use the dispute settlement procedures. 1 13
Where settlement of the dispute is not feasible, Chinese enterprises must
persuade the Chinese government to bring a case before the Dispute Settle-
ment Body. A single enterprise is not normally sufficiently strong to per-
suade the government to launch such an effort, so trade associations
become important. Because of China's recent accession to the WTO, it is
unclear how this problem will develop.
One approach for Chinese companies facing transitional product-spe-
cific safeguard measures1 14 might be to better coordinate among the pro-
ducers through chambers of commerce or trade associations. Strengthened
Chinese trade associations would be able to coordinate Chinese exporters
in a cooperative way before any market disruption occurs. However, it is
very difficult to facilitate cooperation among competitors prior to any
actual complaints and it appears unfair to limit competition in this way.
For the development of stronger trade associations and the solution to the
problems plaguing these trade associations,1 15 a proper legal framework
such as the Trade Association Act should be established and effectively
implemented.
112. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legaLe/28-
dsu e.htm.
113. Id. art. 6.
114. For transitional product-specific safeguard, see the China Protocol, supra note
26, § 16.
115. Besides the problems above, other problems include that a number of trade
associations lack sufficient authority, and enterprises sometimes do not have full confi-
dence in trade associations. For problems trade associations face, see, for example,
Wang yiwei, zhongguo zhengfu jingli jiannan zhuanxing [Chinese Government Undergoing
Hard Transformation], ZHONGHJA GONGSHANG SHIBAO [CHINA BUSINESS TIMES], Nov. 24,
2004, available at http://www.cbt.com.cn/cbtnews/frontend/news.asp?ID=74319 (argu-
ing for the transformation of China's trade associations); Zhang, Promoting Interna-
tional Dialogue, supra note 108 (pointing out it that China only released a few
ministerial-level regulations in guiding association development).
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3. Tax Reimbursements for Newly-Established Small Foreign Trade
Enterprises
Enterprises which qualify as ordinary taxpayers are entitled to tax
reimbursements for exports, and usually have to obtain a special invoice
for value-added taxes (VAT). This special invoice is one of the major docu-
ments used by the tax administration to check for tax reimbursements for
exports. 116 Because of the serious problems that result from cheating on
VAT special invoices for tax reimbursements by virtue of newly-established
enterprises, the State Administration of Taxation issued an urgent notice
in 2004, which set a higher standard for ordinary VAT taxpayers' status.1 17
But there were some tax reimbursement problems for small businesses
engaged in foreign trade. Larger- and medium-sized enterprises would be
regarded as ordinary taxpayers and could therefore get tax reimbursement
for export costs.1 18 However, newly-established small foreign trade enter-
prises frequently could not get these tax reimbursements because they did
not qualify as ordinary taxpayers. 1 19 This presents a dilemma: If smaller
foreign trade operators were to qualify as ordinary taxpayers (and tax reim-
bursements for export were made available to smaller foreign trade enter-
prises) the potential for abuse remains high as enforcement resources
would be insufficient to monitor potential fraud. If, however, tax reim-
bursements are denied to smaller, newly-established foreign trade enter-
prises, this will unfairly hamper economic growth in that crucial sector of
the Chinese economy by creating disadvantages for smaller enterprises
when they conduct international business transactions with foreign part-
ners. Subsequently, the State Administration of Taxation has taken mea-
sures hoping to strike a proper balance between the two sides. 120 Under
these new rules, the newly-established commercial and trade wholesale
116. State Administration of Taxation, Chukou huowu tui(mian)shui guanli banfa
(shixing) [(Tentative) Regulation for Tax Reimbursement (Exemption) for Exported
Goods] (effective Mar. 16, 2005), art. 12(3)(3), available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/
view.jsp?code=200506091225452937 (last visited July 27, 2005).
117. Guanyu jiaqiang xinban shangmao qiye zengzhishui zhengshou guanli youguan
wenti de jingji tongzhi [Urgent Notice of Certain Issues of Strengthening Collection and
Management of Value-added Tax on Newly-established Commercial and Trade Enter-
prises] (effective July 1, 2004), available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/view.jsp?code=
200408131413452015 (last visited July 27, 2005) [hereinafter Urgent Notice]. Under
article 1 of the Urgent Notice, only those newly-established commercial and trade enter-
prises whose annual effective sales amount reaches 1,800,000 renminbi after the tax
registration date are qualified for ordinary taxpayer status recognition. All the newly-
established small commercial and trade enterprises are subject to management as small-
scale taxpayers, which means that it would be much more difficult for these small busi-
nesses to get tax reimbursements for exports.
118. Id. art. 1(2). Under article 1(2) of the Urgent Notice, newly established large
and medium sized commercial and trade enterprises could directly be subject to the
administration as the ordinary taxpayers, provided that they have large-scale business, a
fixed place of business, stable buying and selling channels of commodities, as well as
complete management and business accounting systems.
119. Id.
120. Guanyu jiaqiang xinban shangmao qiye zengzhishui zhengshou guanli youguan
wenti de buchong tongzhi [Supplementary Notice of Certain Issues of Strengthening
Collection and Management of Value-added Tax on Newly-established Commercial and
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enterprises may enjoy ordinary taxpayer status and get tax reimbursements
for export if they meet several conditions. 12 1 They cannot, however, get
special invoices for VAT so as to prevent potential abuse. Unfortunately,
the aforementioned measures adopted by the State Administration of Taxa-
tion cannot resolve the problem completely. For instance, non-wholesale
enterprises have not been included in the new rule. If newly-established
commercial and trade wholesale enterprises choose to conduct import
activities or hope to get the VAT special invoices, they have to reapply for
ordinary taxpayer status and are subject to the examination and verifica-
tion of the competent taxation agency. 12 2
4. Harmonized Rules for Domestic and Foreign Trade
While China has a network of rules for foreign trade, this is not true
for domestic trade. Except for several vague administrative regulations, no
such satisfactory law has been adopted by the National People's Congress.
One of the first priorities for MOFCOM and other government agencies
should be the establishment of uniform domestic trade rules to ensure
their consistency with China's foreign trade rules. As stipulated by the FTA
2004,123 China should provide national treatment under certain circum-
stances. The problem is that if there is no uniform treatment for Chinese
citizens and entities in China, it would be difficult for China to provide
national treatment for foreign entities. With such uniformity, the foreign
and domestic trade regimes would be able to interact harmoniously.
5. MOFCOM's Role in Dispute Settlements
Finally, it would be very helpful for Chinese companies' anti-dumping
compromise strategies if MOFCOM could provide more specific and
detailed assistance in structuring discussions. For example, MOFCOM
could organize more opportunities for settlement discussions, perhaps
with a MOFCOM official serving as the moderator for the meetings. This
would facilitate settlements of many anti-dumping disputes. Unfortunately,
the 2004 amendments do not provide detailed guidance for MOFCOM. 124
Trade Enterprises] (effective Dec. 1, 2004), available at http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/
view.jsp?code=200412081609156310 (last visited Jul. 27, 2005).
121. See id. art. 2. To sum up, these conditions are: (i) the enterprises apply for ordi-
nary taxpayer status to deal with tax reimbursements for exports; (ii) the enterprises
only carry out export activities for goods; (iii) the enterprises need not use the special
invoices for VAT; (iv) the application documents should be subject to examination and
verification by the competent taxation administration; and (v) there is a sales contract or
an intent to transact evidenced in writing, as well as clear buying and selling channels
certified by suppliers.
122. Id.
123. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 6. Article 6 states:
The People's Republic of China shall, in accordance with the international trea-
ties and agreements to which it is a contracting party or a participating party
grant the other contracting parties or participating parties, or on the principle of
reciprocity grant the other party most-favored-nation treatment or national treat-
ment in the field of foreign trade.
Id.
124. FTA 2004, supra note 2.
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When encountering anti-dumping charges from other WTO Members,
it is sometimes wise for Chinese enterprises to negotiate with the investi-
gating authorities and adopt a flexible strategy to make compromises that
are less severe than potential anti-dumping duties. Compromise strategies
have the advantage of reducing the risk of anti-dumping duties, while ena-
bling the enterprise to minimize its potential loss of market share. Chinese
enterprises also prefer to cooperate with relevant parties, including down-
stream producers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and importers.
Chinese culture generally favors harmonious discussions rather than
sharply adversarial hard bargaining. Such compromises with investigating
authorities, as well as negotiations and cooperation with NGOs, down-
stream producers, and importers in the importing country, would help set-
tle anti-dumping suits in a more favorable way for Chinese enterprises.
Such alternative strategies may also be beneficial to the importing country
because they maximize the potential for smooth cooperation on overall
trade relations. Settling disputes assists all parties in that the potential loss
of market share can be minimized, and the downstream producers and cus-
tomers will continue to have access to a full and vigorous market. Thus,
settlement by virtue of strengthened negotiation based on experience
would be of great value.
A single Chinese enterprise, however much it may wish to negotiate,
simply does not at the present time have the expertise or resources to con-
duct such negotiations against very sophisticated foreign counterparts,
with sophisticated legal teams. Probably only MOFCOM is in the best
position at this time to develop, collect experience, and optimize negotia-
tion practices. MOFCOM can collect specific data, amass experience on
negotiating strategies, and maximize the usage, providing suggestions and
guidance to relatively inexperienced Chinese enterprises facing anti-dump-
ing complaints from sophisticated foreign challengers regarding their strat-
egies for negotiation and settlement.
6. Rules to Handle Dislocations Resulting from the WTO Accession
Current rules should be further developed in order to better cope with
the possible dislocations arising out of China's WTO accession. China has
made substantial commitments for WTO entry, and the liberalization of
international trade will undoubtedly cause negative effects for China's rele-
vant industries. Such effects may include decreased earnings, plant clos-
ings, higher skill levels for workers, and layoffs. The FTA 2004 has certain
rules which focus on these eventualities. Specifically, the State may pro-
vide the concerned domestic industry with necessary support in case the
conditions of the safeguard measures are met. 125 These costs would be
125. Id. art. 44. Article 44 states:
Where a product is being imported in substantially increased quantities and
under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the
domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive products, the State
may take safeguard measures as necessary to eliminate or mitigate such injury
or threat of injury and provide the industry concerned with necessary support.
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very real for China. However, this general rule is not sufficient to deal with
all of the issues presented. How to provide the necessary help? Will it
include income maintenance, training, job search assistance, and reloca-
tion assistance? If so, how and what amount of funds should be provided?
These issues should be addressed in the FTA 2004.
7. Flawed Rules on the Issue of Agency in Foreign Trade
Finally, the stipulation on agency in foreign trade operation must be
improved. As discussed above, the FTA 2004 has made a significant break-
through by replacing the traditional special permission regime with the
registration procedure. 126 Unless exempted by laws, regulations or
responsible authorities, 127 foreign trade operators are required to register
with the competent agencies. If they fail to do so, the Customs authority
can refuse to process the procedures of declaration, examination, and
release for the imported and exported goods.128 In practice, a great num-
ber of Chinese businesses fail to register, and hence they cannot conduct
foreign trade transactions. This is because a number of domestic enter-
prises are not capable of handling international trade due to shortage of
experience, qualified personnel, or funding. These unregistered enter-
prises still have to rely on agents to carry international trade dealings.
In the FTA 2004, the one-sentence rule on agency in foreign trade pro-
vides "[foreign trade dealers may accept the authorization of others and
conduct foreign trade as an agent within its scope of business."'129
Although it specifies the right of the agent in foreign trade, it leaves several
questions unanswered: who is qualified to be the principal under the FTA
2004? Is it without any limitation or are only registered foreign trade oper-
ators qualified? What are the rights of the principal? What are the conse-
quences for a violation of the rule of agency in international trade? In
practice, legal practitioners for agents and principals in foreign trade would
invoke relevant provisions of Contract Law 130 and General Principles of
Civil Law' 3 ' when they address the issue of agency in China's foreign
trade. However, these provisions in the above two statutes could hardly
answer all possible questions arising out of agency in foreign trade, partic-
ularly the issues discussed above. Therefore, the uncertainty in these
aspects might, at least to a certain degree, hinder the smooth operation of
the agency system in foreign trade. It is thus necessary to further improve
the rule of agency in foreign trade.
Id.
126. Compare id. art. 9, with FTA 1994, supra note 3, art. 9.
127. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 9.
128. Id.
129. Id. art. 12.
130. For information on contracts for mandate, see generally Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Hetong Fa [People's Republic of China Contract Law], ch. 21.
131. Section 2 of Chapter 4 of Zonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minfa Tongze [People's
Republic of China General Principles of Civil Law] governs the issue of agency.
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III. The Reform of Foreign Trade Regulation in Specific Industries:
The Case of Textile Exportation
In addition to the FTA 2004 as the general law governing foreign trade,
China has developed a network of largely administrative regulations deal-
ing with specific foreign trade issues. One prominent example is textile
exportation regulations. As a labor-intense industry, textile has been the
traditional strength among China's exporters. Textile exportation has been
a very heated issue particularly after the abolishment of quotas on textile
product. Presently, Chinese textile exporters are facing a serious threat
regarding the imposition of safeguard measures from China's trading part-
ners, with which China has been actively negotiating. Additionally, China
has been active in making domestic adjustments. One typical example is
the recent enactment of the PMGET, which repealed a prior interim mea-
sure.13 2 Although it is relatively short, the PMGET strongly pushes for-
ward the smooth operation of China's textile exportation after its entry
into the WTO. The PMGET clearly indicates that the Chinese government
is trying its utmost to deal with this issue quickly.
A. Objective of Interim Textile Exportation Regulation
The PMGET aims to reform the development pattern of China's textile
exportation from the sole increase of quantity to that of quality, and to
stabilize the exportation order of textile. 133 Moreover, the PMGET would
greatly contribute to a stable and foreseeable system, and further help
domestic textile industries properly arrange the production and exporta-
tion following the latest agreement on textiles between China and the EU.
It would also, to certain degree, help Chinese enterprises increase the
added value and quality of textile products rather than endure a price war
which would lead to a race to the bottom. This would benefit the world
market as a whole since it is expected to reduce the impact of irrational
Chinese textile export on the world market by virtue of proper self-
adjustments.
B. Two Essential Points in the Interim Textile Exportation Regulation
Under the new textile exportation regulation regime, 134 the MOFCOM
is responsible for the interim regulation of textile exportation. The
MOFCOM would work jointly with China Customs and General Adminis-
tration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) to pro-
mulgate and adjust the Commodity List for Interim Regulation of Textile
Exportation (List for Interim Regulation) which would be publicized. 135
132. Provisional Measures Governing Exportation of Textiles (Interim) (promulgated
by the Ministry of Commerce, June 19, 2005, effective July 20, 2005), translation availa-
ble at http://www.tdctrade.com/report/reg/reg_050802.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).
133. Provisional Measures Governing Exportation of Textiles (promulgated by the
Ministry of Commerce, Sept. 16, 2005, effective Sept. 22, 2005), art. 1, translation avail-
able at http://www.tdctrade.com/report/reg/reg-051102.htm [hereinafter PMGET].
134. Id. art. 2(1).
135. Id. art. 3.
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If certain textile products are incorporated in the List for Interim Regu-
lation, they would be subject to interim exportation regulation. 13 6 In
respect of these commodities, foreign trade operators are obliged to go
through approval formalities for interim exportation licenses before the
exportation. 13 7 The licensed amounts of textile commodities are allowed
to be transferred, 138 and the transferee should be registered with the appro-
priate government authorities. 13 9 This stipulation did not exist in the
Interim PMGET. This change indicates that more attention is given to the
market-oriented rule. It would improve the efficiency of exportation as
much as possible.
C. Major Accomplishments of Interim Textile Exportation Regulation
In the past, China has mainly implemented the regulation of textiles
through quotas, which is a rather passive measure. The PMGET has made
substantial developments in this area. Several of these developments are
discussed below.
1. Reform of Regulation Pattern
Under the former quota-oriented textile exportation, the administra-
tion of textile exports has been largely, if not entirely, determined by the
importing countries in terms of the amount, increase, and other like
aspects of the quota. Because of this, China has been left in a rather disad-
vantaged position. Under the PMGET, the Chinese government would
have a bigger say in the regulation of textile exports. In practice, China
would negotiate with the importing countries, and then determine the
commodity, amount, terms, and other matters under the interim textile
exportation regulation. For example, China has recently negotiated an
agreement with the EU on the subject of textile exportation to Europe. The
agreement would be implemented, inter alia, by the interim textile exporta-
tion regulation. This greatly differs from the previous "one-sided" quota
determined by the importing country or area.
2. Narrowed Scope of Products Under the Interim Textile Exportation
Regulation
In the traditional quota system, China's textile commodities were
under a very broad range of quotas. The United States, EU, Canada, and
Turkey have imposed quotas on several kinds of Chinese products. 140
Some importing countries occasionally tried to set overly strict quotas for
136. Id. art. 6.
137. Id. art. 7.
138. Id. art. 14.
139. Id. The registration procedure for foreign trade operators has been discussed in
Section 3(1)(1) of this article.
140. MOFCOM, Shangwubu jiu fangzhipin chukou linshi guanli bangfa da jizhe wen
[MOFCOM Press Conference on the PMGET] (June 22, 2005), available at http://
www.china.org.cn/chinese/zhuanti/fzpdc/896470.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2005) [here-
inafter MOFCOM Press Conference on the PMGET].
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Chinese textile products. Now, under only two circumstances would tex-
tiles be incorporated into the List for Interim Regulation and be subject to
quantitative regulation. Specifically, this would occur in relation to textile
products, which are subject to limitations imposed by relevant countries or
regions and for textile products which should be subject to temporary
quantitative regulation pursuant to a bilateral agreement. 14 1 The new
interim exportation regulation governing export to the EU applies to only
ten kinds of products, which account for thirty-six percent of China's total
textile exportation to the EU.
142
3. Strengthened Punishments against Illegal Practices
As opposed to the former vague and relatively general principles in the
legal liability provisions, the PMGET vows to combat behavior which dis-
rupts the market. One typical example is the penalties for possible evasion
of regulations. If Chinese textile products under the List for Interim Regu-
lation have been exported to stipulated countries or regions by first being
sent to third countries, the identities of the lawbreaking operators would be
made public, and they would be prevented from exporting their products
for one year. 143 Because this punishment includes both economic and
moral consequences, it will likely serve as a better deterrent.
4. Increased Transparency and Just Administration
The PMGET seems to attach greater importance to both the trans-
parency and equality of textile regulation. Under the new rule, the cate-
gory and quantity of commodities that every operator can apply for is
identified and the list is published on the MOFCOM website within thirty
days after the disclosure of the List for Interim Regulation. 14 4 A certain
proportion of interim licensed exports is determined by bidding, and the
remainder is allocated in accordance with export performance. The
formula that is used to determine the amount for which operators can
apply has also been clearly specified. 145 Moreover, the regime treats all
enterprises equally regardless of their ownership. This mechanism encour-
ages competition and enables competent enterprises to export their
products.
In respect of the change from passive to positive regulation and
increased transparency, the PMGET follows the provisions of the FTA
2004. Moreover, the PMGET permits the transfer of licensed export
amount and further develops the market-oriented spirit, which would in
turn affect the FTA 2004. It shows the possible interaction between the
general and specific foreign trade regulations.
141. PMGET, supra note 133, arts. 8(1), 8(2).
142. MOFCOM Press Conference on the PMGET, supra note 140.
143. PMGET, supra note 133, art. 27.
144. Id. art. 11.
145. Id. art. 9.
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IV. Challenges Remaining for China
China's adjustment to WTO rules has been reflected in amendments
to laws, regulations, and rules pursuant to the obligations imposed upon
China by WTO accession. As a result of accession, China faces a number
of serious challenges. When it comes to China's commitment to the WTO,
some commitments seem to go further, and China has fulfilled some obli-
gations ahead of schedule. This section analyzes several of the challenges
facing China, and proposes some realistic solutions.
A. The Nonmarket Economy Issue in the Anti-dumping Cases Against
China
Under China's commitment to the WTO, China may theoretically be
treated as a nonmarket economy for up to fifteen years after the date of
accession. 146 The importing WTO member may use a methodology that is
not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices or costs in China if
the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that "market econ-
omy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with
regard to manufacture, production and sale of that product." 14 7 With
respect to many trading partners, such as the U.S., China is unlikely to
obtain market economy status in the next ten years. China has become a
very popular target of anti-dumping measures. 14 8 The anti-dumping mea-
sures against China, in many cases, have been abused and constitute a non-
tariff trade barrier. 14 9 That might be part of the reason that some critics
are working toward the abolishment of undeserved anti-dumping
measures.
146. Section 15(a)(ii) of the China Protocol stipulates that an importing Member
could use a "methodology that is not based on a strict comparison with domestic prices
or costs in China if the producers under investigation cannot clearly show that market
economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product with regard to
manufacture, production and sale of that product." Further, section 15(d) specifies that
the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire "15 years after the date of accession."
China Protocol, supra note 26, §§ 15(a)(ii), 15(d).
147. Id. § 15(a)(ii).
148. One report states:
The [European] Community has currently 32 definitive anti-dumping measures
in force and 22 ongoing anti-dumping investigations (6 new cases and 16
reviews) against China. The most important products by import volume subject
to measures are bicycles and their parts, fluorescent lamps, dead-burned magne-
sium and fluorspar.
The US has currently 52 anti-dumping measures in force against China on prod-
ucts such as chemicals, non-iron and steel products (e.g. potassium permanga-
nate, pure magnesium, steel concrete reinforcing bars).
Bilateral Trade Relations: China - Market Economy Status in Trade Defence Investiga-
tions, Jun. 28 2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/
china/pr280604 en.htm.
149. See, e.g., MOFCOM, FOREIGN MARKET ACCESS REPORT 2005, at 128-31 (2005),
available at http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/table/2005en.pdf (identifying factors such as
improper choice of surrogate country, inconsistency in considering factors of produc-
tion and selection of surrogate price) [hereinafter FOREIGN MARKET AcCESs REPORT].
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The reasons for the abuse of anti-dumping measures are evident. Anti-
dumping measures help protect the domestic industries of importing WTO
members.15 0 The nonmarket economy status provisions make it even eas-
ier to protect these markets. In one recent case in which the EU took anti-
dumping measures against China,15 1 the EU Council stated that all criteria
of market economy treatment must "be applied to each undertaking indi-
vidually."'1 52 The EU Court of First Instance agreed with this view-
point,'5 3 referring to the obligation to show that market-economy
conditions prevail for "this producer or [these] producers." 154 If Chinese
producers wish to avail themselves of "the possibility to have normal value
determined on the basis of rules applicable to market-economy countries,"
they shall fulfill the said obligation. 155 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/
96, as amended, 15 6 still requires a showing that market-economy condi-
tions prevail for "this producer or producers" with respect to the manufac-
ture and sale of the product at issue, as a precondition to a normal
valuation of Chinese products determined on the basis of rules applicable
to market-economy countries. 15 7 The China Protocol explicitly stipulates
that if the "producers under investigation can clearly show that market
economy conditions prevail in the industry producing the like product
with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that product, the
importing WTO Member shall use Chinese prices or costs for the industry
under investigation in determining price comparability."' 58 Further, the
term "industry" has been used three times in the China Protocol with
regard to price comparability in determining subsidies and dumping.' 5 9 It
seems that the terms "producer" or "producers" are different from the term
"industry," the term repeatedly used in the China Protocol. Focusing on a
150. See, e.g., Understanding the WTO: The Agreements-Anti-Dumping, Subsidies,
Safeguards, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tife/agrm8_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2006).
151. Case T-255/01, Changzhou Hailong Electronics & Light Fixtures Co. Ltd., Zheji-
ang Yankon Group Co. Ltd v. Council, para. 9, judgment of Oct. 23, 2003, available at
http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/actu/activites/act03/0328en.htm.
152. Id. para. 35.
153. Id. para. 40 ("The Community legislature ... clearly intended the application of
the rules relating to market-economy countries to products from the PRC to be depen-
dent on the presentation [by those concerned] of a properly substantiated claim in
accordance with the criteria and procedures set out in [the relevant regulation].")
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Council Regulation 384/96, 1995 OJ. (L 056) 1 (EC), amended by Council Regu-
lation 2331/96, 1996 OJ. (L 317) 1 (EC); Council Regulation 905/98, 1998 OJ. (L 128)
18 (EC); Council Regulation 2238/2000, 2000 OJ. (L 305) 1 (EC); Council Regulation
461/2004, 2004 OJ. (L 77) 12 (EC) [hereinafter Basic Regulation].
157. Id. art 2(7)(b); see also Case T-255/01, Changzhou Hailong Electronics & Light
Fixtures Co. Ltd., Zhejiang Yankon Group Co. Ltd v. Council, para. 5, judgment of Oct.
23, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/cj/en/actu/activites/act03/0328en.htm.
158. China Protocol, supra note 26, § 15(a)(i).
159. Sections 15(a)(i), 15(a)(ii), 15(d) of the China Protocol use terms that clearly
show that market economy conditions prevail in the "industry" (producing the like
product with regard to the manufacture, production and sale of that product). Id.
§§ 15(a)(i), 15(a)(ii), 15(d).
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single "producer" or just a few "producers" is certainly substantially differ-
ent than focusing on an entire "industry," and it seems the "producer" or
"producers" standard is not consistent with the WTO rules for Chinese
accession. 16
0
How can China approach this problem? It is very important for Chi-
nese enterprises to bear in mind that it is vital to operate consistently
inside of the WTO Agreement and other international rules, which are of
great importance in terms of the accounting records. The failure to comply
with international and domestic accounting requirements would probably
lead to unfavorable results. Moreover, the coordination and self-discipline
amongst producers and manufacturers should be strengthened, in order to
avoid the "race to the bottom" phenomenon in the prices of exported prod-
ucts. This would help prevent a price war that may occur in the importing
country or region, which often triggers anti-dumping measures.
In addition, China has gained the recognition of Market Economy Sta-
tus (MES) from many WTO members around the world. 16 1 China lodged
its request for MES on June 1, 2003, and subsequently provided supporting
documentation. 162 This request was denied by the EU in 2004.163 The EU
denied MES to China because China failed to satisfy the criteria for market
economy treatment in several ways. Given the deficiencies, the EU made
the following recommendations: (1) decisions about prices, costs and
inputs should be made in response to market signals and without signifi-
cant state interference, with costs of inputs substantially reflecting market
values; (2) one set of basic accounting records consistent with the require-
ments should be implemented; (3) firms should be subject to bankruptcy
160. See Wang Heng, What is the Way Out for China in the Antidumping Cases?, in EU
ANTI-DUMPING LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 492-93 (Francis Snyder & Tang Qingyang
eds., 2005).
161. As of the end of 2005, over fifty countries have recognized China's market econ-
omy status, and the EU was actively considering doing so. See Toh Han Shih, EU Ready
to Grant China Key Economic Status: Austria; Anti-dumping Charges Less Likely with
Change, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST., Dec. 18, 2005, at 4.
Up to Jun. 28, 2004, there are eight countries which have recognized the market econ-
omy status of China. Up to Jan. 28, 2005, fifty-one countries have recognized the market
economy status of China, of which New Zealand was the first one to recognize China's
market economy status in April, 2004. In 2005, thirteen countries accepted China's full
market economy status, including Australia, Belarus, Israel, Kazakhstan, Republic of
Korea, and Ukraine. Among China's trade partners whose trade volume exceeds one
hundred billion US dollars, Republic of Korea is the first to recognize the full market
status of China. Zhang Yi, Shangwubu cheng yiyou wushiyige guojia chengren zhongguo
wanquan shichang jingi diwei, [MOFCOM Said that Fifty-One Countries Recognized
China's Full Market Economy Status], XINHUA NEws AGENCY, Jan. 29, 2006, available at
http://business.sohu.com/20060129/n241642452.shtml.
162. Yang Liming, Oumeng jujue chengren zhongguo wanquan shichang jingi diwei
[European Union Refuse to Recognize China's Full Market Economy Status], SoHu, June 29,
2004, available at http://business.sohu.com/2004/06/29/98/article220759843.shtml.
For the European Commission conclusion on China's market economy status, see Qi
Hua & Dai Yan, EU Ruling on China's Market Status 'Unfair', CHINA DAILY, June 30,
2004, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-06/30/ content_
344132.htm.
163. EU Set to Refuse China Full Market Economy Status, DAILY STAR, June 29, 2004,
available at http://www.thedailystar.net/2004/06/29/d40629051262.htm.
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and property laws guaranteeing legal certainty and stability; and (4) the
financial sector should be fully independent.164
The recommendations made by the EU present fundamental eco-
nomic, legal, and social challenges to China, and would involve systematic
reform efforts. While it would be unwise for China not to make efforts to
improve in these areas, setting the standards for MES so unreasonably high
in the short term might create a potentially unstable social situation inside
China in which the social costs of MES compliance outweigh the potential
benefits of WTO participation. Furthermore, allowing Russia 16 5 and
Ukraine 16 6 MES while denying it to China seems deeply unfair and eco-
nomically indefensible to many Chinese. 16 7 The issue of MES is not just a
legal question, but a political one as well. The EU needs to develop and
articulate consistent and transparent standards applied evenhandedly to all
MES applicant countries in order to maintain its credibility and legitimacy.
Differing standards and differing treatment leave some Chinese disap-
pointed and cynical about objective and consistent market regulations. 168
While the EU's four recommendations are difficult to address immedi-
ately, some of them could be met in the near future. Even though the
efforts inside China may be substantial, reforming China's bankruptcy law
and enactment of property law, 16 9 for instance, seem pressing priorities in
establishing a market system in China. Moreover, the political relationship
and dialogue with all of China's trade partners should be enhanced to solve
problems in bilateral trade relations. 170 Current Chinese and EU methods,
164. Liming, supra note 162. For instance, the EU believes that China has taken non-
market control over the import and export of resources like Coca-Cola, and China's
financial sector fails to operate in accordance with market economy rule, which leads to
a great amount of bad debts.
165. EU Announces Formal Recognition of Russia as "Market Economy" in Major
Milestone on Road to WTO Membership (May 22, 2002), http://europa.eu.int/comm/
externalrelations/russia/summit_0502/ip02_775.htm.
166. EU Sees Ukraine as Market Economy, BBC NEws, Dec. 1, 2005, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4486642.stm.
167. Hua & Yan, supra note 162.
168. Market Economy Status on Agenda, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 21, 2004, http://
www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/93536.htm.
169. On July 10, 2005, the Chinese legislature released its draft law on property
rights in full text to the general public, in order to solicit opinions for revisions. The
Commission of Legislative Affairs of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National Peo-
ple's Congress will revise the draft law based on public opinions and submit the revised
draft law to the National People's Congress Standing Committee for a fourth delibera-
tion. Then, the draft law will be submitted to the fourth plenary session of the Tenth
National People's Congress, which will be held in March 2006, for a fifth deliberation.
An adoption vote will occur at this session. See, e.g., Public Opinions Solicited on Property
Law, CHINA DAILY, July 11, 2005, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
doc/2005-07/1 1/content_459072.htm.
170. Bilateral Trade Relations (China), http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/ issues/
bilateral/countries/china/index en.htm (last visited Jul. 28, 2005). For instance:
Ensuring full and timely implementation of WTO commitments is one of the
European Commission's key priorities in its bilateral trade and economic rela-
tionship with China. The main issues identified so far by the EU side include
inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights, the definition of multi-
faceted industrial policies which might discriminate against foreign companies
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for example, of conducting trade policy dialogues are helpful. 171 Recently,
both sides consulted to resolve issues relating to the special safeguard mea-
sures on textile products.1 72 Such dialogues would be more productive if
they were more frequent and if an early warning alert system were created.
If China succeeded in obtaining MES, it would face a possible increase
in allegations of granting subsidies from other WTO members. 173 Thus,
China is left with two rather unattractive options. In order to avoid this
dilemma, the Chinese economy must be given time to develop further.
B. Transitional Product-Specific Safeguard Mechanism
If importation of Chinese products into a WTO Member increases and
causes, or threaten to cause, "market disruption" to the domestic producers
of like or directly competitive products, the WTO Member may consult
with China; if such consultation fails, the WTO Member affected could,
with respect to such products, "withdraw concessions or otherwise ...
limit imports only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy such mar-
ket disruption.' 17 4 This approach is not novel in the history of GATT and
the WTO, and though many Contracting Parties have these safeguard
mechanisms, they are rarely, if ever, invoked.17 5
The use of the product-specific safeguard mechanism was included in
the Chinese WTO obligations. 1 76 The Chinese impression at the time was
that such measures were very seldom invoked. Much to the surprise and
consternation of the Chinese, such measures have been threatened fre-
quently by the United States. and EU. 177 The U.S. threats are more fre-
(e.g. in the automobile sector), the barriers to market access in a number of
services sectors (e.g. construction, banking, telecommunications, express cou-
rier). Access to raw materials has recently been identified as a major trade issue.
During the last EU-China summit in December 2004, the two parties set the
objective to actively explore the feasibility of concluding a new framework
agreement.
Id.
171. Zhongguoyu oumengjianli maoyi zhengce duihuajizhi [China and European Union
Establish Trade Policy Dialogue Mechanism], PHOENIxTV.coM, Oct. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.phoenixtv.com/home/news/Inland/200310/30/128796.html; see also
Press Release, MOFCOM, The Second China-EU Trade Policy Dialogue is Held in Beijing
(July 15, 2005), available at http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/a/200507/200507001
68364.html.
172. China and the EU have reached a textile agreement, negotiated by EU Trade
Commissioner Peter Mandelson and MOFCOM Minister Bo Xilai on June 10, 2005 in
Shanghai. For the full text of this agreement, see EU-China Textile Agreement, June 10,
2005, available at http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/pren140605.htm.
173. If China obtains MES, imposition of anti-dumping measures by other WTO
members would be much more difficult. Other non-tariff measures, such as subsidy
allegation, will likely be used against China in the future.
174. See China Protocol, supra note 26, § 16.
175. See, e.g., Understanding the WTO: The Agreements-Anti-Dumping, Subsidies,
Safeguards, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto.e/whatis-e/tif-e/agrm8e.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2006).
176. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
177. For instance, the United States initiated six new anti-dumping investigations
against imports from China and twelve special safeguard investigations against Chinese
textiles in 2004. FOREIGN MARKET AcCESs REPORT, supra note 149, at 127.
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quent in number as well as more offensive in tone, and some Chinese feel
that they were misled during the WTO negotiations regarding the signifi-
cance of the special-product safeguard measures.
If we take into consideration the great trade volume' 7 8 and high levels
of protectionism, 179 this problem becomes even more significant. Com-
pared with the term "serious injury" in the Agreement on Safeguards,' 8 0
the wording "market disruption" is certainly easier for a member state to
invoke.
Because of the commitments made during WTO accession, China has
little room for interpretation of the above-mentioned term of "market dis-
ruption." That does not mean there is no way out. One approach for Chi-
nese exporters facing product-specific safeguard measures might be better
coordination among the producers through chambers of commerce and
other organizations, such as trade associations. However, the coordination
of Chinese exporters through trade associations prior to any potential mar-
ket disruption, as discussed above, is difficult to execute and sometimes
seems unfair.18 ' The other solution might be a political one. For example,
meetings between high-ranking officials seems to aid the Sino-United
States relationship. However, the problem is significant for Chinese enter-
prises because once the product-specific safeguard mechanism is invoked,
Chinese enterprises are in a defensive position. Because these special safe-
guard measures are fairly easy to invoke and even abuse, the potential for
dispute is significant.' 8 2 Further, such special safeguard measures could
spread like the plague, with numerous other Members initiating similar
complaints.' 8 3
C. The Unsatisfactory Performance of China's Financial Sector
No one would deny that China's accession to the WTO has brought
great changes and fresh blood into the Chinese financial industry. As of
the end of October 2004, 62 foreign banks from 19 nations and regions
have established 204 operating institutions in China, 105 of which have
178. China is becoming an increasingly important country in terms of its interna-
tional trade volume.
179. See, e.g., The Prevalence of Anti-dumping Action, http://www.cbo.gov/
showdoc.cfm?index=439&sequence=3 (last visited Feb. 12, 2006) (providing statistics
the use of anti-dumping actions by certain countries).
180. Safeguards Agreement, supra note 83, art. 2(1). The article states:
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has
determined . . . that such product is being imported into its territory in such
increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic
industry that produces like or directly competitive products.
Id.
181. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
183. For example, if the United States takes special safeguard measures, it would be
possible that other WTO Members, such as European countries and Japan, would con-
sider imposing similar measures.
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been permitted to conduct business in renminbi' 84 in China. 185 Nine Chi-
nese banks are allowed to attract foreign shareholders.' 8 6 Foreign partici-
pation in China's financial sector greatly facilitates the development of the
Chinese financial industry. This section of the Article discusses the
problems in China's financial sector. Because of the complexity of finan-
cial services, the discussions focus on the banking and securities field in
the Chinese domestic market.
Generally speaking, Chinese banks fail to perform well in the interna-
tional market. 187 Because of the limited competitive power of Chinese
banks and the stringent restrictions on the market network and business
scope of foreign banks imposed by host countries, few Chinese banks and
other financial institutions have branches in the EU, Japan, or the United
States.' 8 8 This makes it difficult for Chinese financial institutions to com-
pete with other banks and brokers in the international financial market.
There are other problems that deserve further attention from China and its
main trade partners in order to promote the international trade in services.
For instance, China had imposed relatively high capital requirements on
the subsidiaries of European banks in China, restricting market access for
foreign banks. Recently, these seem to have decreased.' 8 9 On the other
hand, pursuant to German law, the capital of bank head offices cannot be
counted into that of its German subsidiaries unless the bank's headquar-
ters are in the EU, Japan or the United States. 190 This stipulation puts
Chinese commercial banks at a disadvantage in terms of capital require-
ment when they establish subsidiaries in Germany.
In the domestic market, Chinese banks also encounter numerous chal-
lenges. However, this does not mean that China has been hesitant to open
184. Renminbi is the local currency of China.
185. China Banking Regulatory Commission, Zhongguo yinhangye maichu xin bufa
[China's Banking Sector is on the March] (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chi-
nese/module/viewinfo.jsp?infolD=1021 [hereinafter China's Banking Sector is on the
March].
186. Id.
187. Maria Tombly, Another Barrier Falls in China, SECURITIES INDUSTRIES NEws, Mar.
28, 2005.
188. For instance, as of September 30, 2004, only three Chinese banks, namely, Bank
of China, Bank of Communication, and CITIC Bank have set up branches in the U.S.
FOREIGN MARKET ACCESS REPORT, supra note 149, at 136.
189. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued the Rules for
Implementing the Regulation of the People's Republic of China Governing Foreign-
funded Financial Institutions (New Rules) on August 2004 which replaced the Rules for
the Regulation of the People's Republic of China Governing Foreign-funded Financial
Institutions promulgated on January 25, 2002. The New Rules have "reduced the regis-
tered capital requirement for foreign-funded institutions when they enlarge the business
scope." Zhang Jianpin, Woguo jiang fangkuan waizi yinhang he caiwu gongsi shichang
zhunru biaozhun [China Lowers Market Access Standards for Foreign-funded Banks and
Finance Corporations], XINHUA NET, Aug. 4, 2004, available at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/stock/2004-08/04/content1706954.htm.
190. German banking legislation provides that "apart from the EU, Japanese and U.S.
banks, the capital of head offices of other foreign commercial banks cannot be counted
as the capital of their subsidiaries in Germany." FOREIGN MARKET ACCESS REPORT, supra
note 149, at 192.
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its financial sector. On the contrary, two Chinese cities, Shenyang and
Xi'an, were opened to foreign financial institutions in 2004 in order to
engage in renminbi business one year ahead of schedule. 19 1 This change
will help facilitate the development of western and northeastern China.
Within five years of China's accession into the WTO, "all geographic
restrictions will be removed" for renminbi business, 19 2 and foreign banks
will conduct foreign and local currency business in China without geo-
graphic restrictions after the end of 2006.193 This will provide more
opportunities for foreign institutions. In contrast, domestic banks that
grew because of geographic restrictions and other protections will have to
make some changes.
However there are two sides to every coin. Though the non-perform-
ing loans (NPLs) seem to have decreased, they remain a heavy burden on
China's banks. 194 The situation is even more challenging for China's rural
financial cooperatives, which historically provided financial services to
their members.' 95 Due to poor management and other factors, the NPLs
are a big problem and China's banks have to cope with them so as to satis-
factorily maintain capital. 19 6 It will not be easy to compete with foreign
financial conglomerates carrying such a heavy load. Further, China failed
to predict the effects of the opening up of its financial market. Originally,
China was proud of its vast network of financial institutions' offices
throughout its territory, and was confident that foreign counterparts could
hardly compete with China's financial institutions in this field. 19 7 How-
191. China's Banking Sector is on the March, supra note 185. For renminbi business,
the geographic restriction will be phased out "[wlithin four years after accession ... [for]
Shenyang and Xi'an .... " See Working Party on the Accession of China, Report of the
Working Party on the Accession of China add., Schedule of Specific Commitments on Ser-
vices, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2, 33 (Oct. 1, 2001).
192. Id.
193. With regard to foreign currency business, "there will be no geographic restric-
tion upon accession." Id.
194. David Lague, If China Economy Dips, Loans Could Turn Sour, INT'L HERALD TRIB-
UNE, June 4, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/
2005/06/03/business/loans.php.
195. Economy to Maintain Fast, Stable Momentum, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 4, 2004, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/04/content397271.htm.
196. In accordance with the statistics as of March 31, 2005 provided by the China
Banking Regulatory Commission, the Outstanding Balance of NPLs of State-Owned
Commercial Banks (SOCBs) in the first quarter of 2005 is 1,567,050 renminbi, which
accounts for fifteen percent in total loans. See NPLs of Commercial Banks as of Sep. 30,
2005, http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/module/viewinfojsp?infolD=1392 (last visited
June 18, 2005).
197. Some believed that because the four state-owned banks of China (Bank of China,
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Agricultural
Bank of China) "have more than ten thousand operational establishments all over China
... it would be completely impossible for foreign banks to set up such a huge amount of
establishments in China." Financial Market Should be Opened to Both Insiders and Out-
siders, 21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC REPORT, Nov. 23, 2000, available at http://
www.sinoliberal.net/private/private%20bank%2002.htm. After the WTO accession,
one banker thought that Chinese-funded banks have "the advantage of business office
network throughout China ... it is very difficult for foreign banks to catch up in short
time." Opening up in the Process of Competition to Competition in the Process of Opening
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ever, after three years, foreign financial institutions have successfully
attracted the best customers, 19 8 and Chinese financial operators have had
difficulty competing in services and returns. 19 9 The vast network of state-
owned Chinese bank offices is not economically efficient; on the contrary,
they bring great problems, such as excessive overhead costs and excessive
management levels, thereby reducing central management control.20 0
Some Chinese financial institutions, such as banks, have begun to close
those offices which fail to turn a profit. 20 1 In the field of international
financial business, quite a number of Chinese banks still fail to provide
customers with credit cards which can be used overseas. For example, the
Agricultural Bank of China has closed a number of economically ineffi-
cient branches. 20 2 Consequently, the agricultural industry's financial
needs are not being adequately met. This presents a dilemma for Chinese
policy makers who face a severe shortage of financing for the crucial devel-
opment of rural areas.
20 3
Developing highly profitable business in the domestic market is of
major concern for China's banks. Few foreign banks provide comprehen-
sive services inside China.20 4 In many cases, foreign financial institutions
are very interested in providing investment banking services to their
domestic corporations doing business in China. On many occasions for-
eign banks would like to provide loans to foreign enterprises or enterprises
with foreign investment.20 5 There are not many foreign banks which will
provide loans in the Chinese domestic economy, even if they are willing to
collect commissions from Chinese enterprises to list their company in for-
eign stock markets. This means that foreign institutions are not very active in
China's loan-giving though they seem to prefer that to some investment bank-
Up, BEIJING BUSINESS TODAY, Dec. 2, 2004, available at http://www.bjbusiness.com.cn/
20041202/yaowen4.htm.
198. Foreign banks are starting to pose strong competition to Chinese banks in the
pursuit of top corporate customers, such as Ericsson. See, e.g., All Uphill for Foreign
Banks, FIN. TIMES Bus. LTD, Dec. 8, 2003, available at http://www.fdimagazine.com/
news/fullstory.php/aid/455/All uphill for foreignbanks..html.
199. Id.
200. For example, the four big state-owned commercial banks have made substantial
efforts in "closing and merging low-efficient operational establishments . . . which
greatly improves the income per capita, profit per capita, as well as revenue and profits
level of operational establishments." Review and Recommendations to Operational Out-
come of Four Big State-owned Commercial Banks, SHENZHEN FINANCE, Nov. 2, 2003, availa-
ble at http://www.szjr.net/szjr/control/ProcessServlet?eventld=240&articleid=346&
source=1.
201. Id.
202. The Agricultural Bank of China closed 1,700 branches in 2001. Ning Nan &
Ren Xuesong, Zhengjiu yinhang [Save the Banks], SOHU.COM (China), Apr. 16, 2002, avail-
able at http://business.sohu.com/61/86/article200508661.shtml.
203. China Reshuffles Rural Financial Service System, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, June 24,
2004, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200406/24/eng20040624147351.
html.
204. For instance, "only a few global giants, like HSBC and Citibank, and strong
regional banks, like Hang Seng and Bank of East Asia, have the ambition and resources"
to join consumer banking in China. All Uphill for Foreign Banks, supra note 198.
205. Id.
Vol. 39
2006 Chinese Views on Modern Marco Polos
ing services. Foreign financial institutions have also begun to take the lead-
ing role in highly technical services like portfolio management, services
such as listing abroad, and other services that Chinese banks cannot
provide. 20 6
Another noteworthy issue is the pricing of shares of China's financial
institutions. To expand business in China, many foreign banks consider
partnering with Chinese banks by buying stakes in domestic banks20 7 in
accordance with relevant rules. 20 8 If even one good Chinese financial insti-
tution sets its price very low, this will have a detrimental effect on other
Chinese banks interested in attracting foreign strategic investors, setting off
a race to the bottom. This is a short-sighted strategy for China's banking
sector. Once more, it is clear how important chambers of commerce and
self-regulatory organizations are to maintaining a robust Chinese economy
over the long term.
Although some Chinese financial institutions are doing a better job, it
is clear that more challenges lie ahead for the Chinese financial sector. In
addition to legal solutions, nonlegal solutions need to be considered as
well. For example, the establishment of a credit rating and reference sys-
tem throughout China would be helpful in reducing the risk financial insti-
tutions face. One other solution may be the engagement of excellent
financial professionals, with better control of risks, and provision of better
services, which may take a long time.
If there is severe crisis in services, especially financial services, China
has at least two safety valves. First, imports and exports can be restricted
in order to "maintain the State's international financial status and the bal-
ance of international payment. '20 9 Second, in the event that the increase
of services provided to China by "service suppliers from other countries or
regions causes or threatens to cause injury" to Chinese service suppliers
providing like or directly competitive services, China may take measures
necessary to handle the injury or threat of injury. 2 10 This resembles the
safeguard measures for trade in services. 2 11 The problems of how and
206. Shortly after China's accession into the WTO, a joint-venture subsidiary of Erics-
son, the global mobile phone company left its mainland banker, the Bank of Communi-
cations, for Citibank, because the local bank simply could not provide a service
involving account receivables. "The so-called 'Ericsson incident' was a wake-up call to
the local banking industry." Id.
207. "As foreign banks double their efforts to court partners in China, the country's
banking industry, scheduled to be fully open by 2006, has been thrust into a heated
battle." Sino-foreign Bank Collaboration Heats up Competition, PEOPLE's DAILY ONLINE,
July 19, 2005, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200507/19/eng20050719-l96
845.html.
208. See Administrative Rules Governing the Equity Investment in Chinese Financial
Institutions by Overseas Financial Institutions (promulgated by China Banking Regula-
tory Commission, Dec. 8, 2003), available at http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/mod-en00/jsp/
en004002.jsp?infolD=552&type=1 (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
209. FTA 2004, supra note 2, art. 16(9).
210. Id. art. 45.
211. With regard to the safeguard mechanisms for trade in services, see, for example,
Yong-Shik Lee, Safeguard Mechanisms for Trade in Services, in WTO AND CHINA: THE ROAD
TO FREE TRADE 144-81 (Wang Guiguo & David Smith, eds., 2002).
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when to invoke these provisions still remains unclear, as there are no
detailed rules concerning these measures. Undoubtedly, these provisions
would rarely be available under normal conditions. The serious problems
of the Chinese service industry, particularly the financial sector, remain.
D. Unfair Agricultural Subsidies by Some Members
The agricultural industry faces major developmental challenges.
Unlike the EU and the United States, which, because of their wealth, are
able to provide very generous subsidies to their agricultural sectors, China
cannot offer export subsidies for agricultural products because of its WTO
accession commitment. 21 2 China cannot afford to give as much financial
support to its agricultural sector as other advanced WTO members can.
The EU and U.S. subsidies often go to large agri-businesses. 2 13 In contrast,
Chinese subsidies go to peasants that tend to be more numerous, much
poorer, less educated, more remotely located, with very low quality land,
and have less access to sophisticated farming technology than their Euro-
pean or American counterparts. 2 14 Although Chinese citizens have to
make substantial sacrifices in order to fulfill China's WTO commitments,
it seems unfair to ask impoverished Chinese peasants to bear a heavier
relative burden than those receiving agricultural subsidies in the United
States and EU. The subsidies appear to be a game mostly for wealthy
players.
This problem is not unique to China. The vast amounts of agricultural
subsidies provided by the United States and EU have terribly distorted the
international agricultural market, undermining the free trade policies
espoused by these WTO Members. This is also of great concern to other
WTO Members who are not in a position to provide similar agricultural
subsidies and therefore are placed in a disadvantageous position in the
international agriculture trading system. This issue should be addressed
even though it may be bad news to those in the United States and EU who
receive subsidies.
E. Other Challenges
In addition to the problems discussed above, China faces several other
challenges. While it is difficult to discuss all the problems here, several of
the significant challenges are addressed below.
212. Section 12(1) of the China Protocol states that "China shall implement the provi-
sions contained in China's Schedule of Concessions and Commitments on Goods and,
as specifically provided in this Protocol, those of the Agreement on Agriculture. In this
context, China shall not maintain or introduce any export subsidies on agricultural
products." China Protocol, supra note 26, § 12(1).
213. See, e.g., Marcela Valente, End to Subsidies would not end Rural Poverty, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Dec. 2, 2005, available at http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=
31280.
214. Focus: Peasants Bear Brunt of China's WTO Reforms, ASIAN ECONOMIC NEws (Beij-
ing), Mar. 11, 2002, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOWDP/
is_2002_March 11/ai 84335990.
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1. Proper Usage of Safeguard Measures
According to the figures provided by the National Bureau of Statistics,
China's industrial output fell below expectations in the first half of
2004.215 This situation continued in October 2004.216 Notably, China
has recently controlled investing and lending in an effort to cool certain
overheated economic sectors, including steel, coal, and housing.2
17 Impos-
ing safeguard measures on imported steel in China has contributed to the
problem of price increases overheating this sector. Safeguard measures
often provide short term benefits, but exacerbate the underlying problems
in the long term. 2 18 Before any safeguard measures are undertaken, thor-
ough statistical analysis is needed. This is not easy, however, because of
the obvious need for speed when a sudden surge of imports floods the
market. 2 19
2. Structure and Growth Mode
Other problems that may curb China's economic growth still exist,
including the fact that China's current structure and economic growth
mode do not fully accord with market economy rules. For instance, reduc-
tions in the scale of fixed-asset investment to avoid inflation still could see
possible rebounds. Furthermore, the government's strategies to success-
fully "cope with the situation after China's World Trade Organization grace
period" remain to be seen.2 20
3. Competition Law
To contend with anticompetitive activities in international trade, the
Antimonopoly Act has been proposed, and is expected to be enacted in the
215. Figures released by the National Bureau of Statistics showed that "industrial
added value rose 17.7 per cent [sic] in the first half year, compared with a 17% growth
for 2003." China's Industrial Output Slows Down, CHINA DAILY, July 9, 2004, available at
http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/09/content_347128.htm.
216. Liang Li, China's Industrial Output Slows Slightly, BEIJING PORTAL, Nov. 11, 2004,
available at http://www.beijingportal.com.cn/7838/2004/11/11/ 1380@2367839.htm
("China's industrial output growth in October has slowed to 15.7 percent compared to
the same period last year, after a 16.1 percent gain in September, suggesting government
lending curbs are cooling the economy.")
217. The Chinese government's efforts to cool down over-heating investment have
had contracted effects on related industrial sectors, which in turn dragged down the
production of heavy industries. For instance, the growth of cement output slowed by
3.9% from May to June 2004, while steel production dropped 3.3% during that period.
China's Industrial Output Slows Down, supra note 215.
218. This observation is, of course, not unique to China.
219. According to article 2(1) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards:
A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has
determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product is being
imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or relative to
domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to
cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly com-
petitive products.
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 83, art. 2(1).
220. Economy to Maintain Fast, Stable Momentum, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 4, 2004, available
at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/04/content397271.htm.
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first half of 2006.221 There is a longstanding concern that the competitive-
ness of China's domestic corporations will be negatively affected. 22 2 In
fact, there is an urgent need to regulate anticompetitive conduct in the mar-
ket, some of which has been carried out by foreign businesses.
In order to be successful, Chinese anti-trust legislation must provide
some exceptions. For example, the United States 22 3 and a number of other
WTO Members have successfully designed provisions to help small and
medium-sized enterprises export their products. 224 China has enacted the
Anti-Unfair Competition Law,22 5 which is expected to be amended soon.
China is also working towards regulation of anticompetitive behaviors
through bilateral agreements. One such bilateral agreement, between the
EU and China, 22 6 attempts to establish a permanent consultation frame-
work in order to promote greater transparency in a number of areas. 22 7
All of these measures constitute a good start, but more is needed. A
greater effort is required to establish specific, practical, down-to-earth rules
applicable to international trade. Moreover, this type of negotiation will
contribute to China's ability to choose an appropriate strategy on trade and
competition policy within the WTO framework. These types of dialogue
are especially important given the lack of specificity in current WTO
arrangements on trade and competition.
221. Wang Yu, China Speeds up Legislation of Antimonopoly Law, XINHUANET.COM,June
27, 2005, available at http://www.legalinfo.gov.cn/english/News/2005-07/
INFO_20050707.htm (reporting that the preparation of the Antimonopoly Law has been
completed and the legislative process is accelerating).
222. See YoungjinJung & Qian Hao, The New Economic Constitution in China: A Third
Way for Competition Regime?, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 107, 112-13 (2003).
223. See, e.g., MARK R. JOELSON, AN INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER: A GUIDE TO THE
OPERATION OF UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION AND OTHER KEY COMPETITION LAWS IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 25-26, 198-99, 205, 212, 319, 375-76 (2d ed. 2001) (reviewing legis-
lation from the United States, EU, Canada, and Japan).
224. For example, in the United States:
[T]he enforcement of competition laws has increasingly focused on consumer
welfare and economic efficiency. However, this has not always been the case.
When the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 (and for much of the twentieth
century), there was an explicit preference for "pluralism" in terms of diffusion of
economic power. There was also a tendency towards protection of small business
and local economies.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Application of Competition Law: Exemptions
and Exceptions, at 8, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/Misc.25 (2002) (prepared by R.
Shyam Khemani), available at http://www.unctad.org/EN/docs/ditcclpmisc25-en.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (emphasis added). With regard to Japan, "there are provi-
sions for exempting cartels for exports, depressed industries, and small and medium-
sized enterprises." Id. at 22.
225. Law Against Unfair Competition of the People's Republic of China (adopted
Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993), translation available at http://www.colaw.cn/fin-
dlaw/ip/competion.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
226. Terms of Reference of the EU-China Competition Policy Dialogue, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/bilateral/extracts/cn2b en.pdf
(last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
227. Among other things, these matters include: (i) rules and infringement of rules
related to cartels and abuse of dominant positions; (ii) controls of mergers in a global
economy; (iii) liberalization of public services or public utility sectors; and (iv) technical
assistance to China in those sectors. Id.
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4. Unfair Treatment
The protection and promotion of China's exports as well as resistance
against unfair treatment have been incorporated into the FTA 2004, and
should be further studied. In practice, unfair trade barriers and protection-
ism have impeded and distorted international trade involving China. One
example is that while the EU granted Russia 2 28 and Ukraine 2 29 market
economy status recently, it still refuses to recognize China as a market
economy. Though China has recently promulgated relevant rules, 230 the
effect remains to be seen.
5. Currency Valuation
For quite a long time, China has been under great pressure to improve
its foreign exchange mechanism, which closely relates to foreign trade.2 31
These pressures probably contributed to the recent two percent apprecia-
tion of the renminbi. 23 2 China plans to take a pragmatic, step-by-step
approach to liberalize its foreign exchange gradually, and to ensure that it
has the competent regulatory capacity in order to avoid potential problems.
This approach is meant to avoid a repeat of the South-East Asian financial
crisis of the late 1990s, where, many scholars believe, the lack of effective
financial regulations left many countries unprotected against currency
attacks.23 3 More importantly, the value of renminbi must be considered
228. EU Announces Formal Recognition of Russia as "Market Economy" in Major
Milestone on Road to WTO Membership (May 29, 2002), available at http://
europa.eu.int/comm/externaLrelations/russia/summit_05-02/ip2_775.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 26, 2006),
229. EU Sees Ukraine as Market Economy, BBC NEws, Dec. 1, 2005, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4486642.stm.
230. Duiwai maoyi bilei diaocha guize [Regulation on Foreign Trade Barrier Investiga-
tion] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Feb. 2, 2005), available at http://
www.shcs.com.cn/cn/laws/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2006).
231. See RMB Revaluation Unexpected but Just Right: Economists, PEOPLE'S DAILY
ONLINE, July 23, 2005, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200507/23/
eng20050723_197848.html ("[I1n the past couple of years, China has been under con-
tinued pressure from the outside world, which puts it into a dilemma as to when to
adjust the RMB exchange rate."). One report states:
A strong wind calling for the revaluation of the Renminbi has been blowing hard
overseas since the beginning of this year. First of all, Japanese finance minister,
at the seven-nation finance ministers conference, submitted a document similar
to the "plaza agreement" directed against yen in 1985, which called for the
appreciation of the Renminbi. Later, US Treasury Secretary Snow also indicated
that the Renminbi should be revalued. Because the US dollar is going down,
some European and East Asian countries, worried about the competitive impact
generated by China's exported commodities, have, to different extents, also
joined the ranks demanding the appreciation of the Renminbi. As a result, there
has appeared a strong force pressing the revaluation of the Renminbi.
Who Is Boosting a Revaluation of RMB?, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, July 23, 2003, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/200307/23/eng20030723-120865.shtml.
232. Xu Binglan, China Abolishes Yuan-Dollar Peg, CHINA DAILY, July 22, 2005, availa-
ble at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/22/content 462411 .htm.
233. See David T. Llewellyn, Some Lessons for Regulation from Recent Bank Crises
(Oct. 15, 1999) (working paper presented at the Second International Conference on
The New Architecture of International Monetary System, Florence), available at http://
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closely with the poverty alleviation efforts in China. The reason is plain,
since the poverty alleviation would undoubtedly be of great significance
not only to China, but also to China's trading partners in terms of main-
taining China as a prosperous and leading market in the world. The appre-
ciation of the renminbi would necessarily bring serious negative effects on
China's poverty alleviation, and could lower China's importation and con-
sumption whole. Such an outcome would not be good news, in the long
term, even for proponents of renminbi appreciation.
Conclusion
The implementation of the FTA 2004 is supposed to attain three objec-
tives. First, the law would provide equal conditions for various foreign
trade operators in China, speed up the integration of domestic and foreign
trade, and further facilitate free trade. Second, it will help create a fair and
predictable foreign trade environment for Chinese and foreign entities,
helping realize a win-win outcome in the development of both China and
the world community. Third, the FTA 2004 is of great significance to the
establishment and perfection of foreign trade monitoring systems and bal-
ance-of-payments early-warning mechanisms under common international
practices. This will work to reasonably protect the domestic markets and
industries and safeguard national economic security.23 4
The very positive changes made by the new amendments to the FTA
1994 include the virtual elimination of regulatory barriers for individuals
conducting foreign trade. In addition to the new right of foreign trade for
individuals, China promises to establish a mechanism under which indi-
viduals and enterprises can "bring to the attention of the national authori-
ties cases of nonuniform application of the trade regime."'23 5 The FTA
2004 now allows individuals and enterprises to play an increasingly impor-
tant role in international trade administration. Chinese foreign trade deal-
ers are able to report any trade barriers they encounter to MOFCOM, and
seek help in promoting free international trade.
Another positive development is the changed priorities for the distri-
bution principles of quotas, improving the transparency and non-discrimi-
nation principles. In addition, under the FTA 2004, the import of goods is
now free, with some relatively minor restrictions and prohibitions. Per-
haps most important from the Chinese perspective is that the 2004 amend-
ments shift from a passive to a more proactive policy, bringing China's
policies in line with some of the more advanced WTO Members.
In seven specific areas, the FTA 2004 should be improved. First,
vague, imprecise provisions must be changed because they may allow
www.devinit.org/findev/Working%20paper%2011.htm ("We find that the recent dis-
tress of banks in South East Asia is a product of a volatile economy (with strong specula-
tive elements) combined with .. .weak regulation, ineffective supervision both by the
official agencies and the market ....").
234. For the content and significance of the FTA 1994 amendment, see Major Content
and Significance, supra note 30.
235. See China Protocol, supra note 26, § 2(A)(4).
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administrative agencies to exceed their jurisdiction and may also limit the
agencies' ability to respond effectively to trade barriers. Second, the prob-
lem of the relative weakness of the Chinese trade associations was not
addressed by the FTA 2004. The lack of available sanctions for non-com-
plying trade association members will hamper efforts to forestall or
respond effectively to foreign trade competitors' challenges. A third prob-
lem is tax reimbursements for export to newly-established small foreign
trade businesses, which presents considerable enforcement difficulties in
order to prevent fraud. Fourth, China still lacks uniform, harmonized
rules for domestic trade that can operate smoothly with the foreign trade
regime. Fifth, China needs to improve foreign trade practices by develop-
ing more detailed guidance and procedures, especially with respect to
MOFCOM's role in assisting Chinese enterprises that are involved in dis-
putes. Sixth, there is need for more rules to handle dislocations arising out
of China's WTO accession, which would help China to further contribute
to world economy. Finally, certain problems remain in current rules on the
issue of agency in foreign trade, which deserve further clarification and
improvement.
Despite these improvements in areas needing development under the
FTA 2004, even larger challenges remain. There are two major tasks for
China. The first is compliance with its WTO obligations. On this point,
China seems to have done well. The second, and probably more challeng-
ing, task is to establish rules that will aid in China's transition to a market
economy. Making the transition requires combined efforts from domestic,
bilateral, and multilateral sources, as well as legal and nonlegal efforts. To
a certain degree, the WTO has put China on the fast track to a market
economy that is transparent and nondiscriminatory.
Given its vast market and its own economic development, China
should, if it can get its policies and strategies right, improve its perform-
ance and contribute more to international trade. Therefore, the 2004
amendments to the FTA 1994 are just a starting point for China, rather
than a final destination. This is not only a task for the administrative
authorities, but also for scholars, business organizations, and foreign trad-
ers. Welcome back Marco Polo, we are happy to see you again.
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